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Their  cautious approach  in presenting  facts and  findings should  not, 
therefore, be  taken as a deficiency, but  should be  appreciated as a very 
practical way of conveying an important message. 
The aulhors have rightly highlighted the importance of  irrigation rules 
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often helpless in the absenceofeffective  support from institutions.Thepaper 
correctly highlights this aspect and the fact that no management innovation 
can be easily applied in the field or in the organizations in view of the present 
institutional barriers. Some remedial action, however difficult and sensitive 
it might be, should be the urgent concern of  many of  us who are intercsted 
in improved performance of our irrigation systems. 
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from  a survey of  literature on  irrigation-related institutions, personal 
interviews with irrigation ofticials  and fanners in the Faisalabad Zone in 
Punjab, and from other ongoing IIMl research activities in Pakistan. 
A declining investment potential for continued irrigation development 
imposes severe limitations on continued enhancement of the resource base 
and technological inputs. Consequently, both the policymakers and the 
donors  agree  that  the  potential for  further improvement in  irrigation 
performance  lies in  the improved  management  of  irrigation systems. 
However, it is also increasingly felt that management innovations cannot be 
! 
I  I 
I 
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I xiv  SUMMARY 
The stability that has been  achieved in this regard is commendable. 
Despite the trauma of social and administrative changes in transitions, from 
empires to colonial systems and then to hard-earned independence, from 
separate provincial adminislration to one-unit administration and back to a 
federal system, from shad  water sources to  an independent network of 
reservoirs and  li  canals, Pakistan’s irrigation sector now  has a stable 
physical and administrative system. The credit for this acquired stability 
largely goes to the professionals in the sector. 
This long experience has also led to the evolution of a strong irrigation 
tradition  which  has  sustained  the broad-based  community  interest  in 
irrigation. The result is a very complqx institutional milieu in which a set of 
formally established irrigation rules and organizations exists side by  side 
with an intricate set of informal Social institutions. The two sets act like a 
dual system, more often than desired, in conflict with each other. 
Sporadic changes have resulted in another dualism -  a clearly integrated 
composite  physical system, and avery complex, butrelatively uncoordinated 
in:!itulicnal  framework. Federal responsibility for allocation of resources, 
provincial  responsibility for irrigation management, large organizations  with 
centralized  administration, large  numbers of  water  users  with  little 
involvement in  irrigation management decisions, difficult coordination 
among  agencies and their  subunits  and  functions, numerous  laws and 
procedures mixed with traditional concepts and sporadic amendments by 
occasional  enactments  and promulgations, and  more  importantly  the 
countervailing forces that act against formal rules, all conhibute to this vast 
complexity of Pakistan’s irrigation institutions. 
These aspects of  comprehensiveness, complexity, as  well  as  strong 
traditions  are in  themselves the  characterizing features of  Pakistan’s 
irrigation sector. More important  features, however, appear to  be  the 
apparent  incompatibility between  the relatively  outdated institutional 
framewok and the emerging new requirements of  irrigation management, 
on the one hand, and the general ineffectiveness of most of the formally 
established institutions in view of strong socially evolved institutions, on the 
other. 
Despite  the efforts to  achieve stability through  enhanced physical 
infrastructure and technological inputs, the overall outcome of  irrigation 
performance  is reflected poorly  in  low  agricultural yields. Widespread SUMMARY  xv 
~ 
management. 
The stability of administntive and physical systems seems to be at Stake 
when confronled with the overriding effect  of some social institutions, when 
the “exception”  becomes the “rule.” An administrative style meant for strict 
where unity and lines of command give way to numerous sources ofpressure, 
objectivity is eroded by contradicting demands, and deviations from formal 
rules often stand unchallenged. This is the time when formal rules need to 
be reviewed and appropriately changed to attain the desired effects, taking 
account of therigor of informal behaviorthat  has emergeddue to thechanged 
and changing social circumstances. 
Like the imgation rules, organizational shllctures have also undergone 
little change since their inception and these changes lag behind those that 
have taken place in the resource base and technology, and in social demand. 
Manpower and financial  resource levels in irrigation agencies  have remained 
constant or even declined while their work loads have increased manyfold. 
Data collection and processing procedure have remained the same while the 
need for more information has emerged. New organizational units have been 
added to the same management structure. The agency personnel are not only 
compliance is no longer effective in the light of liberalized social behavior 
imgation  misconduct,  severe tail-end  deprivation,  low  productivity of 
manpower and financial resources, and persistent rural poverty are easily 
identifiable [eatures of  this situation, and appear to be both the caws  and 
effects of impediments embodied in the present institutional framework. 
Thus, the main institutional factors which affect irrigation performance 
in Pakistan are identified as: 
*  The overriding effect of socially evolved informal institutions over the 
application of  formal rules and management decisions. 
*  The obsolescence of  irrigation rules, codes and procedures. 
I 
i 
*  The declining relevance of  organizational structures in the light of 
changed circumstances. 
~  I 
I 
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constrained by  outdated, ineffective  and  formal rules but  also by 
inappropriate  mctures,  lack of murces  and increasing demand. 
In this situation, the present forms of organization for irrigation need to 
be  reviewed but changes should be.  considered in a more comprehensive 
manner, along with appropriate revisions of irrigation rules and procedures. 
While a review of formal rules and role structures seems necessary to 
strengthen institutional support for irrigation perf0rmance.a similar  exercise 
in imp.oving  the. information processes  for irrigation management and 
extension services wwld be. necessary to reinforce such efforts. Improved 
mechanisms to produce and transmit appropriate and reliable information 
are a felt need. 
More than  other institutional aspects, the  need  to  develop a wider 
awareness is very closely linked with broader issues of national policy. To 
increase. literacy among rural people is an essential policy step associated 
with social goals of  irrigation. High incidence of  illiteracy hampers overall 
irrigation performance and subverts irrigation’s potential to  reduce rural 
poverty. me paper attempts to place this issue in the context of  the present 
socioeconomic  status  of  the  country  and  of  its  greater  potential  for 
improvement in  this  regard  relative to  other developing countries.  As 
institutions,  policies  and  performance  levels are closely  interrelated, 
attention is drawn to the necessity of  more positive policy initiatives for 
institutional  reform to improve irrigation performance in Pakistan. 
I CHAPTER 1  ! 
Introduction 
SUSTAINABILITY  OF IRRIGATTON systems depends not only on economic, 
within  which  these factors interact.  In  most developing countries, the 
institutions would, in fact, be a major determinant of the potential for any 
further improvement  in  irrigation performance and  for  the  sustained 
contribution of thelatter to the development  and achievement of social goals. 
The irrigation sector of Pakistan, though similar in many respects to those of 
other  developing  countries,  seems to  have  some special institutional 
characteristics  of its own. 
To grasp some of  these special characteristics of  Pakistan’s irrigation 
institutions, it is  necessay to define and understand institutions in a wider 
perspective. The term “institutions” in its popular usage is usually given a 
restricted meaning to refer only to “organizations.” But, as it is applied in 
this paper, the term also covers “rules” (laws.’regulations.  procedures, norms 
and conventions) which, in fact, underlie the organizations and determine 
the “work  roles”  of individuals  and  groups. In  this  sense, the  term 
“institutions” means both “rules” and “roles.” 
Organizational  behavior cannot  he assessed  or changed without reference 
to the institutional environment. However, the emphasis of most evaluations 
and attempted remedial action is often on  organizations  or structured work 
roles,  with  relative  neglect  of  their  underlying  rules.  The outcome, 
invariably,  is not  very  successful.  A  broader  definition  of  the  term 
“institutions”draws attention to this neglected areaof irrigation-related mles 
which arecritically important inassessing theinstitutional impacton ovenll 
irrigation management performance. 
The irrigation institutions in  Pakistan, as in many  of  the South Asian 
countries, appear to remain conspicuously static. Their changes lag behind 
those that have laken place in the resource base and technology over the 
comespond more to their original purposes which were based on feudal and 
colonial requirements, than to present-day needs of  social development. To 
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!  years. For  this reason alone, their level of  adequacy is perceived as to I 
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sustain overall irrigation performance, therefore, much greater attention is 
demanded for the institutional framework to be  made adaptable to other 
changes. Consequently, the present irrigation institutions would have to be 
reviewed to assess their potential for the full realization’of  benefits both from 
the enhanced resource base and from the technological change. 
Adaplability of institutions for sustainable irrigation performance also 
depends on the interaction of relative strengths and weaknesses of the various 
irrigation actors: policymakers, financiers, government agencies, private 
enterprises, landowners, and farmers. This interaction, in turn, is fashioned 
by the socioeconomic context in which the actors operate. Pakistan seems to 
offer some interesting evidence to support not only the fact that a country’s 
they  have been  estahlished, hut also the  fact that they  continue to  be 
circumscribed by the deep-rooted soci  onomic influences of that setting. 
light of the country’s changing needs should, therefore, take account of the 
country’s socioeconomic context as well. 
The institutional impact on irrigation performance  is closely linkcd with 
the  stubbornly persistent rural  poverty  in  the  region. The potential  of 
irrigation for poverty alleviation is another relatively  neglected area  in 




irrigation institutions hear the characteristics of  the social setting in which  ! 
An evaluation of Pakistan’s irrigation K.  tutions and their adaptation in the 
I 
The main objectives of this paper are: 
i.  to highlight the  importance of  irrigation rules  (both formal and 
informal) within  the  institutional  framework  for  irrigation 
management, with special reference to the case of  Pakistan; and 
ii.  todraw attention to the major institutional factors that appear to affcct 
Pakistan’s irrigation performance, emphasizing the urgent need for a 
more comprehensive effort in related research and policy initiatives. 
The paper  is based on  an  extensive survey of literature dealing with 
irrigation-related institutions, and on primary data collected through field 
observations made and interviews conducted in  the Faisalabad Irrigation 
Zone of the Punjah Province. Personal interviews were held with senior- and 
middle-level officers of the Irrigation Department and with fanner groups, INTRODUCTION  3 
mainly to collect information on the application of  formal irrigation rules 
and on the functioning of  formal structures and the influence of  informal 
rules on both. The field investigation was limited to a rapid appraisal which 
wasconducted to isolate  themain issues andproblems,andshouldonly serve 
as a basis for further in-depth studies on a more systematic format. 
Thepaper starts with asection inlroducingabroaderdefinilion  of the term 
“institutions,”  and proceeds to a section outlining the conceptual background 
relating to  the institutional impact on  irrigation performance. These two 
sections would help us to isolate the main areas of institutional requirements 
for improved irrigation performance in Pakistan. A brief description is then 
given of  the salient features of Pakistan’s irrigation institutions, with more 
specific reference to  the  Punjab Irrigation and Power  Department,  the 
country’s largest irrigation organization which is described in the Appcndix 
to the paper. This is followed by  a discussion of  the prospects for making 
this  institutional  framework more  responsivc to  the  present contexl, 
emphasizing on the importance of  irrigation-related codes, rules, norms and 
customs, and on  the essential linkages between  institutional change and 
policy. CHAPTER 2 
Institutions: A Broader Definition 
INSTITUTIONS ARE BASICALLY the established sets of  rules derived from a 
combination of human perceptions and actions. The rules may be in the form 
of written-down laws, or of norms, conventions and traditional practices 
accepted by  a  particular  society. These rules  define and fashion 
normativeness or the sets of behavioral roles of individuals and groups in a 
given context of  human interaction, aiming at a specified set of objectives. 
In this sense, it is a cyclic  phenomenon in which institutions are primarily 
determined by human action, and once established they in turn determine the 
scope and chancter of subsequent human action for desired objectives. Also, 
the roles determined  by  an initial set of  rules,  in  turn, through 
implementation, may surface the need for certain periodic changes in such 
rules. This cyclic nature allows for a dynamic process in institution-building 
to cope with inevitable change. It also helps to establish a balance between 
the dual facilities inherent in  institutions to  both constrain and  liberate 
individual and group action (Bromley 1987). 
The dual facilities  of institutions are of particular importance in imgation. 
Most irrigation rules are meant to constrain the undesirable behavior in the 
distribution and use of water, whereas they are also designed to promote 
organization and provide various opportunities for individual and group 
advancement. Some rules were originally established to ensure centralized 
control, but they were also supposed to provide equity. Dualism also exists 
when some informal rules contradict formal rules. A dynamic process of 
institutional adaptation, therefore, corresponds to a need  to  maintain  a 
balance between these dual functions of  institutions. 
Organizations are networksof behavionl roles arranged into hierarchies 
to elicit desired individual behavior and  coordinated actions obeying a 
certain system of rules (Cemea 1987). This hierarchical arrangement is the 
“organizational structure,” the effect of  which on performance in a given 
situation may also depend on the particular technology of  the task and the 
,  I 
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size of the organization (Aston Group Studies),'  whereas the underlying 
system of rules primarily determines the "organizational culture" which is 
highlighted here as  a significant  factor affecting performance. 
In  popular  usage,  however,  "institutions" are usually regarded  as 
"organizations." The connotation becomes much more common in the use 
of the term "inslitution building" which most often refers to the building up 
of  new  organizations (parastatal bodies, additional units  in  irrigation 
agencies, farmers'  organizations, etc.).  This  way,  any consideration of 
underlying and conditioning rules, norms and conventions as part of  lhe 
overall institutional frmework is usually avoided, and the lapse seems to 
have  resulted  in  the  limited  success so  far achieved  in  establishing 
appropriately  comprehensive institutional  mechanisms  for  irrigation 
management. 
This preferred emphasis and its apparent failure can be compared lo an 
attempt to build and maintain physical structures without due attention to the 
relevance  of  construction and maintenance  specifications, government 
regulations,  environmental condi  tions, material quality and user preferences. 
Also, some selective  organizational reforms are similar to piecemeal and ad 
hoc modifications on old buildings with no relation to lhe conditions and 
technology under which they were originally constructed. Both structures 
and rules are equally  important operational  conditions.  Changed 
performance objectives that relate to changcd circumstances would require 
review and reform in both operational structures and operational rules. 
The  International Imgation  Management Institute (IIMI)  gives the 






1 The Aston group consisting of Pugh,  Hickson, Hinings. MacDonald, Turner. and Lupton 
cam4  out  research in the  1960s on data collected from 46 manufacturing and  sewice 
organiratims.  The  research was conducted at  the Industrial Administration Re$-h  Unit 
of the University of  Aslon in Birmingham. England. and was repned in the Administrative 
Science Quanrdy in a series of five anieles (see for instance. Hickson et 11.  1969).  Ilieir 
main  thesis  thal  technology  was  a  dependent  organizational variable  attracted much 
enthusiasm and criticism among others (Perrow 1970) who argued that technology was an 
independent variable.  However.  the  undisplted canclusim  that  size.  technology and 
s1IIIclure are all related, is  relevanr to the understanding dlarge imgalim  organizations and 
their perfomlance.  An interesting feature in the present cmtext is thal technology is also 
associated with some institutional camwned. a bias that affear the oreanimtim.  Rieapr 
~  ~  ~~~~~ 
between  irrigation  and  agriculture.  and  between  civil  engineering  and  agricultural 
engineering illustrate this influence. 
I  I 
I  I , 
1 
I 
The institutions that affect irrigation are not only those that manage it 
directly. Other kinds of  institutions condition rhe legal, social, political 
and economic  environment within which irrigation must function, and 
INSTITUTIONS: A BROADER DEFINITION 
I 
I  these can have significant impact on system performance. 
This interpretation recognizes the usefulness of  a broader definition of 
“institutions” to cover the various constellations of  rules as well as roles 
associated with irrigation management. It also draws special attention to  the 
types of institutions which tend to escape the normal reviews, but which are 
nevertheless important in attempts at performance improvement. 
Although  it  is not  uncommon  to  make  definitional distinctions in 
sociology between institutions  and organizations (Cernea 1987), this paper, 
without disputing the validity of such distinctions, refers to both aspects 
together and  treats organizations as a subset of a more comprehensive 
institutional  system. 
Within  this  larger  definitional  scope,  the  main  irrigation-related 






I  *  Legal  :  Acts,  Promulgations,  Orders, Ordinances, 
international and  national water  agreements, 
contracts and Memoranda of Understanding; 
*  Social  :  Customs and  traditional practices  (such  as 
warabandi),  land  and  water  rights, informal 
behavior (such as corruption and rent-seeking), 
and tenancy relationships; 
*  Political  :  Macro-level irrigation objectives (manifestos); 
*  Economic  :  Water  taxes,  cost-recovery rules,  land sale 
practices, and lease arrangements: and 
-cv~~~~~~~~n~~y,  UI  U~C  IJIICIZI~~UUII~  ~OIIMIC omer as  external terms 
oftradeorfixedcommodityprices,salesquotaandintemationaldebt, 
and  in  internal terms of  trade,  pricing policies,  subsidies, and 
budgetary limitations; 
socially. in demographic structure, various forms of  differentiation, 
rural-urban relationships, and health and educational status of the 
work force: 
* 
*  Culturally, in religious beliefs and cultural habits; and 
_I I  8  INSTITUTIONAL  FACTORS AFFECTING IRRIGATION ... 
*  Organizational  :  Irrigation  and  allied agencies, water  users’ 
associations, interagency  coordinating 
organizations, arbitration  tribunals, private 
sector  enterprises, cooperatives and  other 
farmers’ organizations. 
Obviously, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Nor is the above 
list by any means exhaustive. CHAPTER 3 
Conceptual Framework 
CONSTRAINTS, INSTITUTIONS, 
POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE 
CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE considered as “given” in analyzing a partkuk 
situation. Very often, these conditions are imposed on the socioeconomic 
system by  its extemal environment and are referred to as ‘‘externalities.” 
Internally too,  the societiesand economies  have some built-in conditions that 
constrain  changes.  Both  these  can, in  turn,  act as externalities  to 
socioeconomic subsystems such as  the irrigation sector, whereas within the 
subsystems too, therecanbesomeintemalconsaaints  tobehavioralchanges. 
Viewed differently,  the external andinternal  constraints againstimgation 
performance appear to exist in several ways: 
*  Physically, in forms such as weather, sources and supply of water, 
and soil conditions; 
Economically, in  the international economic order as extemal terms 
of trade or fvted commodity prices. sales  quota and international debt, 
and  in  internal terms  of  trade, pricing policies, subsidies, and 
budgetary limitations; 
Socially, in demographic structure, various forms of  differentiation, 
rural-urban relationships, and health and educational status of  the 
work force: 
Culturally, in religious beliefs and cultural habits; and 
Politically,  as ideologies, the  geopolitical structure, and  the 
imperatives of international law. 
Some of these external and internal constraints are adjustable in the long 
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more amenable to change  than any other type of constraint Overall, however, 
most of the external and internal constraints circumscribe the area  of action 
for the policymaker and the system manager who have to consider them as 
given conditions. Thus, the changes in  institutions and policies 
corresponding  tochanging objectivesarepossibleonlywithin  the framework 
of  these fixed constraints. 
Recognizing these "given" conditions, it is customary in socioeconomic 
policy analysis to refer to uncontrollable and partly controllable  variables in 
dealing  with  performance  variables (Lecaillon et  al.  1987). One  such 
conceptual model refers to stepwise influences by constraints, institutions, 
and policies on performance, depicted in a series of  concentric rings or 
circles. 
It is imporIant, however, to clarify what is uncontrollable, and what is 
partly controllable. In the current irrigation situation, can the set of variables 
associated with institutions be classified as uncontrollable along with the 
external andinternalconstraintson whichthepolicymakerhaslittlecontrol? 
However rigid in outlook, are all elements of  the institutional framework 
unchangeable by  new  policy  and  management  initiatives? The 
above-mentioned model of concentric circles  provides neither clear answers 
to these questions  nor any clear guidance as to how the institutions are to be 
treated. 
In a static situation as envisaged in the model of concentric circles, where 
institutional  aspects  are  also  considered  as given,  the  management 
I 
1  Figuratively, the made has  hen  visualized by LcCaillan d d.  (1987:43) as:-  .._a  #e"cs  of 
concentric rings fhrocrgh which performnee indicofon  are &cfrd.  The  outer "mg  would 
represent fhr infermlod  eaemnal conrtroinf~  whichore exogcnourly drurmined. Even the 
mmf enlighfcned inrtifufionr  ondpolicirsnre noutrolized byshnks beyondlhe reach of  fhe 
policy  mkw. Moving  inwonlr. fhr next  ring  could be  fhought of  ar represcnfing  the 
inrfifufionalfromework  whichprovidrs fhefoundofionr qfsociefyandfhc basis under which 
the socio-economic sysfem worh. Inrdfutionr  can be nlfered bur only with grm  difiiculfy 
and usually wifh  somewhof ynpredicfoblr nrulls. Sfill moving inwardly. fhe nexf wo rings 
could be mnceivpd  OJ ar cowisling of  tbe set of micmecmomic and agricultwol policy 
inrfrwnenls  over which policy makers fypicolly hove a high degree of  confrol. Finally af  lhe 
cenl~e~ffhiErrriesoffconce~fric  ringsore fheperfononce  indicofors  whichareaffecfed by 
fhem. Expressed more simply. instifufionr  arc affecfed by eonrtroim and. in wn. arovidr 11 
innovations have virtually  no relevance,  or they  may  confront m:lny 
difficulties  which  can have  only  limited  success.  With  the  resource 
endowment and technology becoming limiting factors, further improvcrncnt 
in performance would hc possible only with enhanced institutional support. 
A static institutional framework therefore becomes inappropriate and acts as 
a barrier to  progress. The combined effect of  uncontrollable constraints and 
unchanged institutions  would be to make policy and managcmcnt action 
ineffective, and to gradually depress the levels of  performance. 
For sustainable improvement in performance, therefore, it is necessary to 
recognize  the  potential  of  a dynamic and cybernetic  process of  regular 
feedback  and necessary  rcmcdial  action. This entails the appropriate 
adaptation of  institulions according to  changing needs and related changcs 
or policy. Only such adaptation and changes will provide opportunities for 
improvements in management and performance. Howcvcr, any institutional 
change would he  possible only within the framework of  fixed external and 
many,  such  as  in countries  whcrc cultural  rigidities  are dominant, 
institutional  change is  more  difficult and  sustained pcrlormancc 
improvement more douhtful. 
CONCEPIVAL FRAMEWORK 
I 
inlernal constraints (uncontrollable variables):  where such constraints arc  I 
i 
MODIFIED VERSION OF 
THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL 
Considcring these implications, the paper adopts a modified version of  the 
above conceptual  explanation  of concentric  influences. It recognizes the 
flcxihility for institutional change that may exist within the system or the 
subsystem  when controllahlcvxiables includingthoserclating toinstitutions 
arc more effcctively hnndled.  It  is argued  that  within  a  more dynamic 
managcment situation. both the system manager and the policymaker have 
a role to play in  institutional rcfom. The modified conceptual fmnework 
acknowledges on  the one hand. that constraints, apart  rrom their advcrse' 
effcot through the mcdium or institutions, could also directly affcct policy 
formulation and performance: and on the othcr. that management and policy 
initiatives would be necessary to bring about whatever possible institutional 
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changes. Simply, it is to understand that institutions are not part of a fixed 
set of  constraints within a socioeconomic system. This modified conceptual 
framework is as  shown helow in Figure 1. 
Figure I.  Corrcepiual  Jrmework. 




Influence flow  iii the italic siluiltioi). 
Posrihle feedback and remedial actiai. 
MOSI  irrigation institutions, except someof the socially evolved ones such 
as wxiitioiial and informal practices, are basically the expressions of policy 
(this  supports  the  above cybernetic model).  Primarily, such  policy 
expressions are in thc form of various water laws which then form the basis 
for administrative procedures, rules and regulations (subsidiary legislation). 
The laws also give rise to an implementation  machinery  (organizations) 
without which the primxy and subsidiary laws become mere theory. The 
underlying philosophy for such codified and structured behavior is directly 
relalcd  to  all the  surrounding  conditions  in  a given  context.  Irrigation 
institutions, can. therefore. he changed through appropriate policy changes, 
but within the given situational conditions. Even if the constraints xe  fixed, 
possibilities  exist  within  their  influence to  formulate new  policies  for 
improvements in  institutions, and thereby in performance.  What a 
policymaker, :I  manager, or a change agent can do, therelore, is to focus on 
the conlrollabl-  variables. 
I 
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The above explanation can  be  used  to  clarify the  following main 
i.  The external and internal constraints in any social system, or any 
subsystem such as the irrigation sector, affect the development of 
institutions  which, in tum,affectpolicyformulationandmanagement 
performance: 
ii.  Generally, the institutions that include both rules and role srnctures 
cannot be  easily  changed, and  this apparent rigidity tends to be 
recognized as a given condition, thus restricting the potential for 
performance improvement: 
iii.  Wifh  some ejorf, at least some of the institutions can be changed, or 
made more responsive and adaptable to overall changing needs, if 
the constraining influences can  be  isolated and the potential for 
possible change can be identified, 
iv.  Such institutional adaptability is essential at this stage to  enable the 
formulation and implementatian of  new policies: and 
v.  New policy initiatives are necessary to remove barriers against the 
application of  management innovations essential for  improved 
performance. 
In summarizing the foregoing, the institutions are seen as  being primarily 
meant to institute or establish some social control over any collective effort, 
for an orderly pattern of  human behavior. and for equitable distribution of 
its benefits. They are in  the form of an established set of rules and roles 
acceptable to the majority of those concerned, and concurrellt with a desired 
set of objectives, but adaptable  depending on the needs of  the particular time 
and the contextual constraints. 
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FRAGMENTED RESEARCH ATTENTION 
ON INSTITUTIONS 
Irrigation institutions are only part of the total  institutional framework of any 
society, and their possible changes, therefore, have to be considered in the 
overall context. While in general, there has been little impact of research and 
development  efforts on  institutional  strengthening, the  few  attempts 
specifically focusedon the institutionalaspectsofimgation  havealso tended 
to be too nmow and fragmented.  Imgation has attracted extensive scientific 
discussion, but the impact of  this theoretical knowledge on the institutional 
environment of  irrigation is  minimal in relation to the contribution made by 
changes in the resource base and technology.  Consequently, the major 
weakness of the Asian irrigation sector has been identified as "not the lack 
of  technology  nor  the  lack  of financial resources  but  a shortage  of 
institutional organization"  (Takase and Wickham 1977). Although fmancial 
resources have also now surfaced as a concern for many countries in  the 
region, the institutional constraints have continued to be the major weakness 
which appears to have eluded sufficiently  comprehensive attention. 
Two main reasons are attributable to this apparent failure of institutional 
development. One is the emphasis placed on some selected components of 
the institutional aspects to the relative neglect of  other equally important 
components. The other reason is, as mentioned earlier, the role played by 
external and internal constraints against institutional change, same of which 
1 
1  Manyhavecomnientedonthisgapinihespplicationofavailableiheorelicalk~owledge.The 
problems of"a bloated bureaucracy"  (Borlaug 1987)and 8n "institutional  vacuum*'  (Bromley 
1987). which often characterize the field of irrigation management in developing countries 
are not seen  as clearly and comprehensively addressed as physical and technical issues of 
irrigation.  The  low  prdunivity  and  the  SOcioecmomic inequalities  in  the  current 
performance of irrigation systems are seen  as the facets of the sme fundamental pmblem: 
inadequate and inappropriate organization (Memy and Wolf  1986). The "syndmne  of 
anarchy" in  irrigation management Man 1978). and pan of the failure of  many irrigation 
systems are attributed to the inappropriate design  of irrigation management organization 
(Wade 1987). These  are presented as outstanding issues that call for B new research Ulmst 
aimed at inililutional reform and a "professional revolution"  (Chamban 1987). The essence 
of  these canments is on the need to use howledge and skills based on  organizational and 
sociological  theory  in  the  design  of  appropriate  imtitulional  mechanisms  or  of  their 
appropriate changes for sustaining present-day irrigation systems. CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK  15 
are linked with fairly deep-rooted sociocultural characteristics of  developing 
societies. Very often, institutions were also treatedas given conditions, along 
with  fixed constraints. Both  the selective approach and the constraining 
conditions have tended to retard the process of institutional change, and have 
reached a stage where they Seem to act against the sustainability of irrigation 
performance. 
Within a very rich tradition of research in the sociology of organizations, 
%s effective application to irrigation management can be found only in a few 
areas  of the vast institutional environment of irrigation. Correspondingly, the 
policy  initiatives have  also concentrated on a few  selected aspects of 
institutions, This selectivity in  research and policy concern Seems to lake 
place in three layers: 
i.  Of  the  broad  institutional  framework,  greater  attention  is  on 
organizational structures than on other institutional aspects,  such as, 
water  and  land rights and  rules  governing  them, tenancy 
relationships,  informal  behavior  and  widespread  corruption 
(emphasis on roles rather than on rules); 
ii.  Of organizational  aspects,  greater attention  is on  farmers’ 
organizations than  on  irrigation agencies and their  interface with 
farmers (emphasis on the agriculture end of irrigation rather than on 
main system management): and 
iii.  Of  farm-level organization, greater attention is on  water  users’ 
associations  than on composite multipwpose farmers’ organizations 
(emphasis on “irrigators” rather than on “producers”). 
Notabie attempts in the application of theoretical knowledge can be seen 
in  numerous field experiments and pilot  studies undenaken on  farmers’ 
organizations for irrigation  management. Empirical results from  these 
studies add to the vast body of knowledge in  this limited ma  of  the farm 
level.  However,  the  preoccupation  with  farmer pa~icipation  and  local 
organizations has tended to neglect not only several other important aspects 
of inigation organization but also the underlying sets of rules and traditions 
that define the scope and character of such organization. The latter is almost 
totally neglected. I  ! 
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~  i 
Of imgation organizations, at least three important aspects that have not 
received sufficient attention in the application of available knowledge can 
be identified. They are:  I 
! 
i.  Interagency coordination; 
ii.  Farmer-bureaucracy interface: and 
iii.  Internal dynamics of  irrigation organizations. 
While the three aspects appear to be interrelated, an integrated approach 
to address them necessarily calls for an understanding and review of the 
broad institutional milieu including not only the organizations, but also the 
sets of rules that define them. Where the broad institutional issues have also 
been addressed more carefully (such a  in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea), 
taking into account appropriate land reform, legal reform, and changes in the 
value system, greater has been the success in organizational changes and in 
the overall imgation performance. 
Interagency  coordination, at  the  abstract level,  is primarily a broad 
institutional condition  that affects imgation  performance  favorably or 
unfavorably. Wherever some degree of  coordination has  been  achieved 
either through  less formal  arrangements  (project  committees, advisory 
bodies, etc.) or through formal mechanisms (area development authorities, 
integrated Minishies, etc.), the effect on  performance has been favorable. 
However, overall, the common administrative culture in Asia which is noted 
for  its preference  for  slricl departmentalism  resulting  in traditional 
interdepartmental rivalry, is a significant unfavorable condition affecting the 
achievement of desired irrigation objectives. What this commonly  seen 
institutional condition underlies is a set of uncoordinated work roles, which 
at this structural level is an organizational issue. The failure to rectify this 
situation by  evolving suitable coordinated organizational mechanisms 
linking together the  functions of agriculture and  irrigation, or those of 
construction,  maintenanceandoperation,ismostly  attributable tothe rigidity 
of long-established and entrenched institutions. 
Farmer-bureaucracy interface often suffers from a lack of concern on the 
necessary organizational linkage between  farmers and agencies. Farmers 
either get  organized to  act as a buffer against bureaucratic and  policy 
constraints, or they are organized by agency-based initiatives to support the 
~ 
! 
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objectives of  agencies. Politically motivated pressure  groups and  lobby 
groups clamoring for a better deal in location-specific irrigation management 
needs and concessions against  taxes and water  charges are in  the first 
category, whereas various forms  of agency- or donor-sponsored water users’ 
associations fall within  the  second. Often, these farmers’ organizations 
remain as separate, independent entities which do not form an integral part 
of a composite irrigation management organization. Consequently, fanner 
groups traditionally have tended to perceive the irrigation bureaucracy as 
being insensitive to farmers’ objectives and needs. The inevitable conflict 
can be sccn in an almost insatiable demand from farmers and equally rigid 
defensive positions taken by the agencies in such matters as water deliveries 
and maintenance priorities. 
In the field of  irrigated agriculture. conflict is endemic. It can be seen 
between many individuals and groups competing for the control of scarce 
resources. The conflict between farmers and agency personnel is as common 
as that between racial and ethnic groups, or that between landlords and 
tenants (Lusk ,and Parlin 1988). In  some instances, this ha  been identified 
as a conflict of  interests between the farmers and the State (Lecaillon et al. 
particularly  in  the  context of  large  systems associated  with  Witfogel’s 
“Oriental Despotism.” Some forms of decentralized management have been 
tried to partly mect the resolution of this conflict, but the need to establish a 
viable  farmer-agency  interface as  a  natural extension of  the  irrigation 
organization has  not  received adequate recognition. It is an unavoidable 
requirement as long as any form of bureaucracy is involved in any part of 
the system management. 
Organization  is the  appropriate  means  of  managing social conflict. 
Ironically,  an organization is also a part of social life which inevitably leads 
to conflict. The nature of the society or of  any functional part of  it (like 
irrigated agriculture), determines the extent of  conflict  that  affects the 
orgmizntion. In societies such as in Asia, where political modernization has 
tended to grow at a faster rate than economic development, external social 
pressures  generate a high  degree of conflict within  organizations. The 
individuals  in organizations are pressed between  external pressures and 
normative behavioral roles expected through internal mles and procedure. 
I 
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performance,  therefore,  the  internal  dynamics of  irrigation-related 
organizations need to  be studied in-depth to  assess the appropriateness, 
viability  and possible changes of the  organizations in  the light of their 
fast-changing environment. CHAPTER 4 
Irrigation Institutions in Pakistan 
INCONSONANCE WITH  the abovementioned broader definition of institutions 
and the related conceptual fnmework, the following sections of the paper 
attempt to describe and analyze Pakistan’s inigation institutions in  three 
categories: formal rules, informal rules and organizational structures.  While 
the inevitable linkages between these three aspects are to be appreciated, the 
main purpose of  this categorization is to  highlight the importance of the 
“rules” component of  imgation institutions when institutional changes are 
considered for improved irrigation performance. 
FORMAL RULES 
Most of  the  inigation-related laws in  Pakistan were formulated several 
decades ago. They were introduced at a time when vast VELF  of  newly 
irrigated land  and  newly  established  irrigation infrastructure had  to  be 
administered with minimum management cost, land was relatively abundant 
and control of  water was relatively unimportant. Professional and technical 
resources were also scarce then. The main objective of  irrigation was to 
allocate and distribute water  within  as large an area as feasible and as 
equitably as  possible, and to minimize the burden of maintenance. Rules and 
procedures were meant to underlie a combined system of  physical and 
administrative shuctures geared to administrative convenience than to any 
dynamic management, where stability of the system was valued more than 
its adaptability. 
The rules were designed to be as  comprehensive as pmssible so that their 
strict compliance would  largely enable to  achieve the above objective. 
Whenever some practical needs arose  and. legal loopholes became apparent, 
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purposes, but  the basic  structure of the  original rules  system remained 
unaltered. 
The Act  of  1873.  The most important component of the Cormal  rules 
governing Pakisbn's irrigation operations consists of  irrigation laws which 
are mostly centered on onemajorpieceof legislation, thecanal andDrainage 
Act of 1873. The subsequent amendments and various offshoots for specific 
regional applications have kept this original Canal and Drainage Act as the 
core legal instrument dominating the irrigation scene. Subsidiary legislation 
providing operaling rules for the Canal Acts, various manuals of procedure, 
and revenue and rates manuals form the second component of  formal rules. 
These are several in number and comprise very detailed instructions. The 
thud component is a series of new laws relating to other aspects such as land 
reform, reclamation, and water users' associgions. 
Selected list. Some of the more important laws and manuals of procedures 
established during this period, and still meant (0 be operative, are listed in 
Table 1.' 
Taohlr  1.  Some irrigution-relared laws in Pukistqn 
I.  Canal  and Drainage Act (VIII of 1873)  as amendedby 
Canal and Drainage (Amendment) Act (XIV of  1952). 
Canal and Drainage Extension Act (XXIV of  1964). 
Canal  and  Drainage (West  Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance  (XXllI of  1965)  and 
Canal and Drainage Extension to 111 Lora Canal of  Bmnu District Ordinance (XIII of 
Canal and  Drainage (wen Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance (I  of  1970)  and  (west 
Canal and Drainage Extension to Rohri Canal Area Ordinance (XVll of 1970). 
Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance (XVlll of 1971).  and 
Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Act (XXXII of 1975); 
Act (VII of 1968). 
1969). 
Pakistan 2nd Amendment) Ordinance (lV  of 1970). 
2.  The Punjab Minor Canals Act (Ill of 1905); 
I  Engr. Sardar A. D. Nasir, an Irrigation Engineerand Lawyer.provides adetailedconimentaly 
on the Canal  and  Drainage Ad  (VII of 1873)  and its subsquait Amendments. and on  three 
other Acts. He also gives interesting referewes to some  selected case laws. which provide 
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stable set of  ‘‘rules’’ in their own right. 
Allhough the origin of written-down irrigation mles in Pakistan does not 
go beyond the British colonial period, the basis for inigation rules and 
organizational  structures has a long history otwater regulation which can be 
traced back to the Indus civilization and the later developments during the 
periods of Aryan, Greek and Anb influences.’  Informal irrigation rules 
based on communal ownership and equitable distribution of  water, in fact, 
have the stamp of these multiple influences. 
While several institutionalized irrigation practices can be identified, two 
of  them, the wurabandi  irrigation rotation  system  and  the biradari 
relationship (behavioral pattern based on  a feeling of brotherhood; birudur 
[brother]) are selected for emphasis in this paper. They seem adequately 
illustrative of  socially  evolved  institutions which form  part  of  the 
institutional framework of Pakistan’s irrigation management. 
Wurubandi is a water management system which aims to achieve high 
efficiency in water use by imposing water scarcity on each and every user, 
and by focusing on equity in distribution (Malhotra 1982). Its origin can he 
traced to the early period of irrigation development in this region, over a 
could be supported by the lowest available supply. According to this system, 
a central irrigation agency delivers water at the head of the tertiary level 
watercourse (irrigation disrribution system within the command area served 
by amogha),throughamogha (anoutletfrom thedistributaryorminorcad 
proportional to  the watercourse’s cullurable command area, and farmers 
manage on-farm distribution of water? 
! 
1 
1  century ago, when irrigation had to be extended to a much larger area than 
~ 
to  the watercourse)  which  is designed to  provide a  quantity of  water  1 
1  SeemoredetailsinRadosevifh (1975).Aho.Ioeonsiderwater.s  splblicgd  which should 
ksuhjccllopublicadministnli~  is in keeping withIrlunicconcepls.S~CapmerP(1968). 
2  Doug  Memy in  a  case  sNdy fmm  Pakistan,  describes how the  rmlc d  a pnicular 
wBLermune and the mtations on that watercourse have evolved over time. He refen la the 
lack  of  “fit”  ktween the  imposed  irrigalim  technology  md the  pmxisting  social 
organization of the  village, in explaining the  current pmblcnw  dating to  the wnrsbandi 
system. See “ne  &iology  d  Wsrahdi:  A Case  Study fmm  Pakistan” in Irrigation 
Management in Pakislan: Four Papers. Memy  and Wdf  (1986). I 
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The term warabandi literally means "fixed (bandi) turns (wahr)." The 
account of the practice of both day and night irrigation. The rotation begins 
at the head and proceeds to the tail of the watercourse. Usually, a seven-day 
rotation  forms one  complete  cycle in  which  each  parcel  of  land  in  a 
watercourse receives its water once per week. The allocation is basically a 
I  scheduling is for a time-based continuous rotation of water delivery, taking  ! 
Compromise between  demand and supply  conditions,  and during  each  i 
farmer's turn which is roughly proportional to the area of his parcel of land,  I 
he has the right for all the water flowing  in the watercourse. Themgement 
of  turns is mutually decided by all the farmers in the watercourse, and the 
agency does not interfere unless a dispute arises. This traditional system is 
an informal mgement  and is known as "kacha warabandi." 
The flexibility  in the old farmer-establishedkacha  warabandi system was 
that while the order of  turns was fixed, the day was not. According to the 
kacha warabandi practiced 10 to 15 yean ago, if. for somereason, the canal 
was closed for a period of time during the irrigation season, the farmer who 
should have had his turn at that point of time would get his turn when the 
water returned, and the rotational schedule of turns would continue. Such 
flexibility ensured water for all the farmers, but the lack of  a commonly 
acceptedinstrumenttomonitor the timeand timing ofturnsincreasingly gave 
rise to disputes among the members of farmer groups. With a fast-changing 
society gradually eroding into traditional rural leadership roles, this trend 
toward reduced interpersonal and intergroup harmony was  not surprising. 
The effect ol increased incidence of  irrigation disputes, however, was an 
increase in the extent of agency conml over the system. 
An attempt to formalize the traditional arrangement has led to the more 
regulated'pucca warabandi"' system in which a weekly rotation is fixed by 





the canal officer on request by one or more farmers in a watercoune? Once  i 
I  The Punjab  Public  Works  Depaltment  Revenue Manual  (19873)  gives  the  following 
definition: Wakr-Bondi -  The  scheme or list of  relational tumr or  times at  which each 
shareholder in a wl)lemou~e  obtains his supply or each autlet in a distribulaly is allowed to 
be open. 
2 Appendix  E d  the  Punjab Public Works Department Revenue Manual provides detailed 
insr~lionsforpreparation  andmodification ofurahr-bandis,andelplainr  the espnsibilitiss 
of  Patwarir,  Zilladars and the Canal Officers. 24  1NSTl"IONAL  FACTORS AFFECTING IRRIGATION ... 
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binding on all the farmers who have to take water at his turn irrespective of 
his need. At the initial stages of the warabandi pnctice, day and night turns 
wereassignedpermanently for twosetsoffarmers, but later, these turns were 
also rotated to allow for each set of fanners to shift between day and night 
irrigation on an annual basis. The pucca warabandi has been introduced 
mainly to reduce disputes and conflicts among farmers and was also meant 
to ensure water distribution to be as timely and equitable as possible among 
all, including small and downstream farmers. While the regulated pucca 
warabandi  system has helped  in reducing the scope for disputes among 
farmers, it has also removed the element of  flexibility embodied in  the 
informal system and has tended to apply turns very rigidly irrespective of 
unreliahility of  water flow, soil and topological differentiation, and crop 
water  requirements.  Overall  however, inequity appears to  have  been 
exacerbated.' 
Biradari. While the socially evolved tradition of  kacha warabandi has 
now developed itself into a more formal rule which  is made applicable 
through written-down procedure, the tradition of  biradari in many paJ7.S of 
Pakistan remains a strong social norm. often operating against the formal 
rules of irrigation. The term biradari as parenthetically stated earlier refers 
among members of an endogamous group who consider themselves related 
toeachother (Mirza 1975).However,theterm"endogamous"haslobegiven 
a wide meaning here, as  biradaris have been observed to be local co-resident 
groups based on a combination of  patrilineal descent and intra-biradari 
marriage  (Merrey  and  Wolf  1986). This  kinship  relationship  serves 
important economic and social functions in rural life, and tends to promote 
cooperation and conflict resolution, but when several biradari groups are 
present  in  a  single  irrigation  command, inter-group competition  and 




to a behavioral pattern based on  a feeling of brotherhood? and is generally  ! 
I 
1 
I  1  Merrey (1990 chaper28) questions the long-term sustainability of  the present warabandi 
system in Pakistan inview of gmwingproblemn  associated with it.Whileac~oowledgingthe 
IimiLZtims of presently available technical alternatives and the embedment of  warabandi in 
the local social st~cture,  he highlights the need formore flexible andequitablemanagement 
alternatives. 
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implementation  difficult. Wakil  (1970) observed  that bkadari,  in fact, 
superceded all other loyalties and the formal rules. 
Corruption. Among  the  informal  behavioral  patterns  which  affect 
irrigation performance can be included the  fairly widespread practice of 
rent-seeking. Both officials and beneficiaries  of their services tend to accept 
this as a normal practice in  seven1 activities that involve farmer-agency 
interactions. At least notionally, it is widely accepted as a practice pervading 
all patronage-based public  services, particularly notable  services in the 
irrigation sector being assessment and collection of revenue, construction 
and maintenance, and water distribution activities. Ethically, the practice is 
not condoned by the society, and the legal system is clearly against it; but iui 
long-term survival and the lack of  serious social sanctions against it tend to 
placeit in thecategoryofinformalinstitutions.  Someanalysts haveattempted 
to  quantify its scope,' but  in  view  of  its wide acknowledgement such 
exactness does not seem  necessary for identifying this as a problem which 
is fast being informally institutionalized. 
Land tenure. Fairly well-established tenancy relationships characterized 
by  the dominance of big landlords can be identified as another significant 
social institution that affects irrigation management. Land reform including 
land ceiling and restrictions on land subdivision has had some impact on 
tenurial patterns, but the influence of the large landowners on the one hand, 
and  the fragmentation of land  on  the other,  both  seem to  continue as 
significant institutional factors. Both these issues figured prominently in the 
field interviews conducted for this study. The changes that have occurred in 
the average farm size during the past couple of  decades support the field 
observation  regarding  fragmentation of  land.  Table  2 which  gives a 
comparison of agricultural census data, clearly shows a progressive increase 







Table 2. Dislribulion offarms  according lo  form size (inpercenr). 






I  Source:  BhaIIi and Kijne. 1990. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
Following theSouth Asiantradition  ofinstitutionaldevelopmentforimgated 
agriculture,  Pakistan  has  inherited a  multitude of  state agencies and 
departments to  share the sector’s management responsibility. The broad 
division of  responsibilities between irrigation and agriculture starts at the 
center itself  with  two separate Federal Ministries, and runs through  the 
sec~or’s  whole structure of bureaucracies up  to  the  farm level.  Similar 
separations  can  be seen in  respective line agencies of  irrigation and 
agriculture, depending  on  different  functions such  as construction, 
management, extension and research, and on different components of  the 
physical system such as dams, bmges,  tube  wells, watercourses and farms. 
The Water and Power Development Authonty(WAPDA),linked with the 
Federal Ministry of  Water and Power, is m  autonomous agency created in 
1958 to supervise the construction of large-scale infrastructure in the Indus 
Basin  Project, and  remains as an  agency basically responsible for the 
development  of water resources in the country. WAPDA controls the storage 
dams which  it operates  in consultation  with  Provincial  Irrigation 
Departments (PIDs) according to the water rights and seasonal allocations 
of the provinces. WAPDA has also been responsible for the planning and 
installation  oftube wellsunder thesalinity ControlandReclamationProjects 
(SCARP), and for tile drainage work throughout the country. As in the case IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS IN  PAKISTAN  27 
of barrages and link canals constructed by WAPDA, the completed SCARP 
tube wells also have been transferred  toPIDs for operation and maintenance. 
Provincial Irrigation and Agriculrure Departments. Irrigation is basically 
a provincial subject according to  the distribution of  functions and duties 
under Pakistan’s federal system. The major responsibility for irrigation 
management rests with  the PIDs, and some of its elements are with the 
Provincial  Agriculture  Departments  (PADs).  PIDs undertake  some 
construction work, but primarily attend to the operation and maintenance of 
irrigation facilities extending from barrages and main canals to outlets in the 
watercourses, and to resolution of conflicts among water users, while PADs 
attend to watercourse rehabilitation and on-farm water management. 
Most of  irrigation-related Acts and Mahals of  Procedure define the 
various functions of PIDs relating to design, conshction, operation and 
maintenance of the  country’s extensive irrigation systems, and for  this 
purpose PlDs  have acquired large numbers of  human  resources, thus 
becoming enormous bureaucracies. The Punjab PID itself has more than 
50,ooO  employees, and the four PIDs together more than 80,000.  Table 3 
provides  information about  the  salient  features of Pakistan’s  irrigation 
system and its management organization consisting of four PIDs. 
The Punjab Irrigation andpower Department with over 50,000employees 
is a large organization by any standard. Apart from its size, its responsibility 
for  managing theopenlionsof dmosthOpercent oftheIndus Basinirrigation 
system lying within Pakistan makes it an organization of great importance 
in thecountry.Considering its significance,PunjabPID  is selectedforfurther 
description which is given as an Appendix to the paper. 
To keep the scope of this paper within reasonable limits, its main focus 
of organizational analysis is restricted to the PIDs through the case material 
role  played  by  the  PADs  and  federal  organizations  within  the  total 
institutional framework for Pakistan’s irrigation, and in  fact, the genenl 







relating to the Punjab PID. This does not, however, discount the important  i , 
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lrrigafion canals 
Total length @m) 
Design Q (cumecs) 
Command area ('a00  ha) 
Numbers of staff 
Secretary 
Chief Engineer 
Superintending  Engineer 
Executive Engineer 








u,,,u  NWFP  Baluchistan 
2,665 
7  1  1 
26  7  10 
87  20  17 





574  a6  64  49 
2,312  873  208  177 
3,092  1,240  301  255 
47.185  22,466  4.731  2,859 
50,277  23,706  5,032  3,114 
I  I 
I  I CHAPTER 5 
Deficiencies in the 
Present Institutional Framework 
OF THE INSTITUTIONS mentioned above, the legal enactments and related 
subsidiary legislation are the most explicit components which explain the 
underlying requirements  for individual and  group behavior aimed  at a 
predetermined set of objectives. In  the  principles enunciated and  the 
behavioral rules specified, in great detail in some instances, they also seek 
to clarify the articulated interests on which they are based, and the objectives 
they wish to pursue. How well are these interests and objectives consistent 
with present needs, and therefore, how applicable are these formal  rules  and 
formal role smctures to  the  present context? To  what  extent are they 
compatible with  or capable of  coping  with  other pressing,  informally 
established institutions? 
Meney  and Wolf (1986:31)  after the case study of Gondalpur aptly 
summarize the effect of rather sporadic institutional changes attempted in 
Pakistan: 
Just as the problems of rising water-tables, salinization, and inadequate 
supply of irrigation water are "solved" by installation of a network of 
tubewells. so it seems to be assumed, inadequate organization can be 
solved  by installing a new farmer organization ....  There has been no 
consideration of the dynamics, the adequacy, or the consequences ofthe 
present  organization  of  the  irrigation  system  ...  Although  the  major 
reports and recommendations are thick and comprehensive, none have 
seriously addressed the most  fundamental problem of all for the  future of 
the lndus irrigation system: how should it be organized? What  should be 
the role of the users in its management? What  have been the consequences 
of  the present organizational structure? Policy  based on faulty 
assumptions about the goals, values. ability to co-operate, and behaviors 
of local users is bound to  fail. 
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Considering all the three categories  of institutions (formal rules, informal 
rules  and organizational  structures)  in  the  present  irrigation-related 
institutional framework in Pakistan, two main  interlinked problems are 
discernible. One is the increasingly felt obsolescence of most of the legally 
established rules and role structures in the light of changing social demand 
and new technology; and the other relates to theovemdmg effect of informal 
rules (traditions, norms and practices) over the formally established rules. 
Consequently, it  is often  seen that various contradicting influences by 
different sets of  institutions bear upon organizational behavior, invariably 
depressing its levels of performance. Thus, the subordination of formal rules 
to more powerful social norms appears to characterize the postindependence 
period of Pakistan’s  irrigation management. 
OBSOLESCENCE OF FORMAL RULES 
Only the form@  rules and formal role structures (organizations) can suffer 
from obsolescence, as socially evolved informal institutions are most likely 
to get modified when they are no more relevant to the needs of the day. As 
for the obsolescence and redundancy of  existing formal rules in Pakistan, 
only a few references are made to illustrate the scope of the problem. More 
concrete statements can  be  made  only  after a  detailed analysis of the 
situation. This  does  not  preclude, however, the  validity  of  a general 
observation  that irrigation rules and procedures in Pakistan are considerably 
outdated and need some urgent review. 
As can be seen in the list given in Table 1, out of  several items of such 
laws and formal procedures now operative  in Pakistan. only a few have been 
substantially  amended  since their  inception. Most  amendments  were 
sporadicandlimitedtoafewparagraphs,anddidnotresultinanymeaningful 
change in the original scope  and objectives. The 1873 Act was to go through 
a  major amendment  in  1975 in an  attempt to  remedy  its increasing 
obsolescence.  The background  to  this  amendment can  be seen  in  the 
following comment by Nasir (1981:3): 
The Canal and Drainage Act of  1873 was drafted more than a century 
ago when the irrigation in the Punjab wasin  itsinfancy. With  the extensive I 
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development of  irrigation. many new problems  have arisen for which 
adequate and clear cut provisions do not exist in the Act. The growth in 
serious problems in the equitable distriburion of canal supplies especially 
of internal watercourses within the standard canal irrigation unit of  a 
square.  The influential people  have  been and  are  resorting  to 
canal banks or by using canal water out of their turns and in excess of 
therefore. necessary. 
Evaluations made several years later do not indicate that any significant 
change has occurred in the imgation operations. Nor do they refer to any 
significant effect in farmer behavior. 
i 




unauthorized irrigation by tampering with the outlets or by cutting the 
their legitimate shares. The proposed amendments in the Canal Act are. 
I 
I  i 
i 
i.  In Ihe words of the National Commission on Agricullure (1988289). 
“not only does the availability of  canal water vary seasonally, the 
distribution process itself suffers from certain chronic inequities, the 
worst sufferers being tailenders, is., farmers at  the extreme ends of 
the distributary system.” 
ii.  In Punjab, the situation has been described as one in which “informal 
customs associated with kinship, caste and other social relationships 
frequently lead to an  inequilible distribution  of irrigation  water; 
majorproblemsarereflectedinconflictsbctwcen  farmers  who hinder 
the maintenance of irrigation channels and the disruption of water 
flows by some farmers taking more water from the canal than has 
been allotted to them” (Miru 1989:lS). 
iii.  Similarly in  Sind, although  the  facilities  are monitored  by  the 
Irrigation Departmcnt staff, it has been  found that “some farmers 
manage to  tamper with  the mogha in order to  increase discharge, 
sometimes with  the cooperation  of  ID stall,” and that “the 
watercourses are generally in a dilapidated condition viz, unlined, 
not properly aligned, poor embankments, leakage, occasional cuts 
and inadequate frce board” resulting in substantial water losses (Hai 
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The disappointing results of  attempted amendments in the formal rules 
may be attributed to a lack of recognition given to other social institutions 
that have been left to bear unfettered influence over the formal rules. The 
above evaluations also indicate the futility of attempts to reinforce formal 
rules aimed  merely at  strengthening centralized  control  without any 
reference to local-level organizations. 
Morerecent field data not only confi  this situation, but also signal the 
dangers ahead that the system’s sustainability itself is at slake.’ In the Lagar 
Distributary, out of the 23 breaches reported in 1989,12  had been direct cuts 
across the bank, 10 of  them by farmers for unauthorized irrigation. Another 
9 breaches had been due to overtopping or weak canal banks, and the causes 
of the other 2 breaches were not known. Of the 23 incidents, 14 had occurred 
during night time, and most of  the incidents had  been  first observed by 
farmers. A more  recent survey conducted by  IIMI during one week  in 
mid-August, 1990,on the wholeoftheLagarDistrihutary anditsMinor Jinda 
and on pat  of  the Mananwala Distributary and its Minor Kmkan, indicates 
that the problem can be widespread. In  this survey, 19 incidents of  using 
seasonal pipes, 20 emhankment cuts, and another 13 “leakage” points were 
observed. 
Substantial  water  distribution  inequity  has  been  observed  in  the 
Mananwala  Distributary  in the  Lower Chenab  Canal,  where “outlet 
tampering”  was found in  the form of illegal mcdificaion of  the outlet 
StIucture to draw more than its design discharge, and water theft through 
pipes, siphons  as well  as direct cuts referred  to  as “punctures” in  the 
distributary embankments (Vander Velde 1990). 
The frequency of these interventions, the openness with which they are 
carried out and the absence of any deterrent action illustrate the lack of 
recognition  given  to  formal  rules  laid  down  in  Canal  Acts and  other 
regulations. 
I 
1  A  prelimiaaly obselvalion is  that three main causes,  unatknded maintenance pmblems, 
tampering with the physical system and unauthorized irrigation -  am having a cmbined 
effect on systems‘ sustainabiliiy.  Bureaucratic insensitivilytothese  glaring pmblemr can slso 
be related 10  lack of their appreciation at policy level.  ! I 
I 
~ 
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DOMINANCE OF INFORMAL RULES 
OVER FORMAL RULES  I 
I 
The conflict between formal and informal rules can be identified as  a major 
deficiency in  Pakistan's  present  institutional framework  for irrigation. 
Although the laws, regulations and manuals of procedure call for a highly 
regulated pattern of behavior from individuals andgroups, they arenow often 
observed in the breach. While the written-down rules provide a set of norms 
for both irrigation staff and water users, both these groups seem to find that 
the deviation from rules is an unchallengedbehavior  and the two groups that 
reinforcement  of their deviant behavior. The major reasons implied by slrict 
irrigation regulation for desired behavior include the sc'ilrcity of water as a 
resource and the value attached to it, the complexity of  the physical system 
thatcaptures,conveysanddistributes  water, theneed fortimely andequitable 
distribution of water among a large number of users spread out widely in an 
extensive command area, and concurrently the need to keep the levels of 
managementof all theseactivities at minimum intensity. Ironically, thesame 
reasons appear to  have  subverted the original intentions. This has been 
possible mainly  because the  informally institutionalized behavior  has 
succeeded in overriding the effect of formal rules. 
In view of  the changed circumstances, canal water is far more valuable 
now, and the consequent competition and the high rent-seeking potential 
associated with it make the efficient and equitable distribution of water more 
important than in the past. For equitable distribution of water and to ensure 
that  the outlets draw their authorized full supply discharge, a strict and 
constint watch over the hydraulic performance of  a distributary becomes 
imperative, requiring an equally strict discipline among the members of the 
staff. For this, rigid compliance with formal rules is essential, but ironically, 
it is now thatsuch striclcomplianceseemstobeeasilycircumventedbyother 
social institutions, giving rise to a seemingly immutable vicious circle. The 
following instances illustrate the problem: 
When  the  prevailing  supply level  differs considerably  from  the 
authorizedfull supply level, technically it is not considered advisable 
to restore the designed full supply levels by haphazard silt clearance, 
and instead, adetailed hydraulic survey and remodeling of the whole 
I 
I 
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channel  have  to  be  undertaken.  The remodeling  of a channel 
generally involves alterations in the last hydraulic characteristics of 
the channel and consequent adjustment of control points and outlets. 
The procedure  for this work  is laid down as  formal rules 
(departmental instructions) in the Revenue Manual, which specify 
that the longitudinal sections of all channels of  a Division must be 
scrutinized at least once in five years. However, this procedure has 
now  been  discontinued,  the attributed  remn being  the informal 
pressures exercised by politically and financially influential, large 
landowners. This is one of  many instances where formal rules are 
circumvented by socially accepted informal practices. 
In view of  the persistent and continued maldistribution in Khikhi 
Distributary of theLower GugeraBranch of Bhagat Sub-Division of 
LCC East Circle, a remodeling scheme was framed in  1974.'  The 
scheme envisaged regrading of the L-section, silt clwance  as well 
as adjustment of the outlets, especially in the head reach. The scheme 
was abandoned due to  large-scale, violent  demonstration  and 
agitation by the farmers of the head reach of  the distributary. The 
government of  the time could not withstand the pressure; not only 
was the scheme abandoned.  but  instructions  were also issued 
discouraging such schemes in future. A rather dishwtening effect 
on the departmental  engineers in  their efforts for equitable 
distribution of water was inevitable. 
A  recent  attempt in  Pkislan to provide some legal backing  to 
farmers'  organizations illustrates further the effect of  deep-rooted 
social institutionson formal rules.Theoutcomeofthisefforl  has been 
described by Mirza (19895) as follows: 
* 
* 
Until recently, informal  farmer organizarions ,.. were responsible 
for  collective decisions ofwatercourse cleaning, maintenance and 
scheduling  of  warabandi timings. Water losses were high and 
frequent  conflicts  among  members made  these  modes quite 
incffecrive ....  Henceaswitchtoaformallegalmodeoforganizing 
1  This information is frm  personal experience gained by the coauthor of  this paper, C.  R. 
Firdousi, while he was a senior officer in Punjab PID. i 
I 
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I 
~  *  an increasing work load for all levels of irrigation officials: 
*  a rapid  process  of  politicization of  the adminislrative and social  i 
i 
!  I 
environment 
a resultant change of  attitudes and values toward the application of 
formal rules; and 





The four aspects have a mutually reinforcing effect, thus confirming the 
presence of a “syndrome.” 
The officials who have been given responsibility through formal rules 10 
act against unauthorized irrigation cannot, in fact, cope with the task as they 
Due to the rapid politiciwtion process since independence, the bureaucratic 
power intended by  the formal rules most of  which imply the support of a 
!  I 






do not get adequate administrative and political support to apply the rules. 
colonial-type  skict administration,  has been substantially eroded,  and can no 
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I  quality and effectiveness. Pakistan’s current situation regarding irrigation  I 
I 
Consequently, the existing formal rules and implementation mechanisms 
have lost their significance. Staff supervision. disciplinary action, and legal 
and administrative measures for punitive action have all declined in their 
institutions reflects a common problem that has been observed in many 
developing countries. The pool of  knowledge and the lessons they offer, 
therefore, should be of great value. 
When the irrigation bureaucracy lacks the resources and the willingness 
toenforcelegal  measures against breaches ofthe  rules, theresultisa situation 
of anarchy, which has been described by Walter Coward (1977:7) as the 
“Takahashi effect.” Takahashi (1970) has observed through his case study 
in the Philippines that when the management of  the irrigation system was 
nominally in the hands of the government, at the village there was anarchy 
over the use of water. Anarchy was seen to occur because the irrigators were 
not  organized,  and  even  when  groups existed  they  lacked power  or 
self-regulation,  and also because the bureaucracy was not adequately capable 
of enforcing rules and regulations. The Philippines has since taken several 
steps to overcome this  adverse situation, by  changing the  management 
i 
! 
I  ’ 
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structures, by making them more responsive and accountable to imgators, 
~ I  I 
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and also by organizing irrigators effectively (Korten 1982). Some of  these 
experiences should be of  great relevance and value to the current situation 
in Pakistan. 
Elsewhere, reference has been made to cases “of political influence, Of 
unofficial augmentation of  official  salaries. of falsification of water flow 
records, of turning blind eyes to infringements” (Chambers 1980). However, 
the fact that there are also the instances of imagination and courage to resist 
pressures and to improve performance illustrates the potential for change, 
possibly by making formal rules more relevant to the present context and 
their application more effective, thereby trying to reduce the dysfunctional 
compliance associated with countervailing influences of social institutions.  I 
DECLINING RELEVANCE OF 
PRESENT ROLE STRUCTURES 
The extent  to  which  environmental. technical  and social changes have 
superceded the  relevance of irrigation  organizations  is as equally 
disconcerting as  the degree of obsolescence in formal rules, and the need to 
assess their compatibility with  the present context is equally compelling. 
Organizational structures, distribution of responsibilities and even the size 
of organizations basically remain in the Same form as left by the colonial 
administration.  Minor  sporadic  changes have resulted  only  in  some 
appendages,  and consequent administrative anomalies. 
For instance, the Punjab PID (see Appendix) which was created about a 
hundred years ago, despite its expansion with some new disciplinary wings 
such as Drainage, SCARP, Mechanical, etc., has not changed in its basic 
structure of the Open Canal Circles since its creation. Since then, the demand 
for water has increased manifold due to fragmentation of lands, changes in 
cropping pattern and  expanded irrigable ms,  all  leading  to increased 
problems concerning distribution of water and disputes among the irrigators. 
The Lower Chenab Canal East Circle created in  1890 continues to have 
the same jurisdiction  as  was  originally assigned, and  its present  staff 
deployment as illustrated in Figure 2, also remains at the same level as at the 
time of its creation. The Circle consists of the same numbers of Divisions 
~ 
i 
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I 
Figure 2.  Organizufionnl churl - Faisolabud Region. 
SDO.  SDO  Mohlan  SDO,  Pacca 
Farooqabad  at Mohlan  Dallah at Pacca 
CHIEF ENGINEER 
at  Faisalabad 
Depuly Collenor 
a1ShelkhUpura 
I  I 
Subdwon 
Faisalabad  Faisalabad 
Dallah 
SubEngineer  Sub Engineer 
A,iananwda  Faioaqabad 
Nore:  LCC  =  Lower Chenab  Canal  QB  =  Qadirabad-Balloki 
XEN  =  ExecutiveEngineer  SW  =  Sub-Divisional  Officer 
SE  =  Superintending  Engiiieer 
SubEnginssr 
Gailana I 
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and Sub-Divisions and staff in each category. The Upper Gugera Division, 
for example, has the same 3 Sub-Divisions and Farooqabad Sub-Division 
has the same 3 Engineering Sections, 5 Zilluduri (pertaining to a Zilludur 
who is the canal official who supervises about 10 Puhvuris, who, in turn, are 
the Irrigation Department field officers who make the initial records of fields 
irrigated) Revenue Sections with 58 Patwaris. 
A Patwari is basically required to work almost along with the water flow 
andrecord eachfieldinigatedduring the week. Heisrequiredtorecord3,000 
of  farm-holding  was one “square” (25  acres).  Due to  subsequent 
fragmentation  of  land  through  almost  three  generations,  the  typical 
landholding has been reduced to 2 to 3 acres on the average. Due to pressure 
on land, every small farmer is keen to obtain water and cultivate as much 
of  water, especially during sowing and  maturing  periods,  gives rise to 
disputes among the irrigators. In addition, the Patwari has to attend to many 
meetings at Village and Union Council level, attend camps of  the checking 
officers, and thus, his work has increased substantially so that it is no longer 




























The work of a Sectiorrd Sub-Engineer also has increased many times due 
to increased trespassing and misuse of  the canal roads and tampering with 
i 
supplies, especially during high demand periods. The punitive measures 
enforced a hundred years back are no more effective due to the increased 
economic value of  such behavior. 






The following details of  canal  mileage  within  the Pucca  Dalla 
Name of canal 
Jalluana Distributary  29,000 
Length in feet 
I 
Mulley Distributiuy  54,000  I 
Mnngat Minor  54,000 
I 
Khingranwala Distributary  4,000  I 
Bijwana Sub-Minor  16,000 
Khallar Sub-Minor  3,000 
Khangah DistribuLvy  27,000 
Mataba Distributary  18,M)O  1  Mahniawala Distributary  6,000  i 
1  I I  , 
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I  Khurrianwala Distributary  123,000 
Chukery Minor  35,000 
Rajewala Minor  28,000 
I 
Ranwala Minor  10,ooo 
Shahkot Distributary  I54,oOO 
Shahkot Minors  24,ooo  I 





To travel along these canals once means a total distance of 117 miles. The 
SDO  is expected, according to rules, to inspect them at least twice a month, 
to supervise field staff and check the recording of tail gauges and other field 
infonation. He is also expected to  spend  10 to  15 nights, out  of  his 
headquarters in field locations. The SW  is not provided with any official 
transport,butis expectedtomanage withina fixed traveling allowance  which 
is limited to Rs. 750 per month. 
The work  load of the Executive Engineer also has increased over the 
years. For instance, the number of meetings he has to attend has increased 
considerably. The Executive Engineer, the Upper Gugen Division has to 
attend all district-level coordination, development and other meetings called 
by the respective Deputy Commissioners (as the irrigation boundary of  a 
Division does not coincide with the boundaries of  the civil districts, the 
jurisdiction of the Upper Gugera Division falls within three civil dishicts: 
Faisahbad, Sheikhupun and Gujranwala), in addition to the departmental 
meetings regularly  called  by  the  Superintending Engineer, the Chief 
Engineer, the Secretary, Planning and Development Department, and the 
Minister.  AuditandAccountsmeelingsarealsoheldatregularintervals.The 
monthly tour journals show that an Executive Engineer remains most of  the 
time away from his office in connection with these meetings. Thus, the time 
available forhisprimarydutiesof managing thehigation system asrequired 
in the manuals of procedure is greatly reduced and, therefore, he is unable to 







Similarly, at the Circle and Regional levels the work load has increased 
and the environment has changed. No extra staff has been provided to cope 
I 
l 
with Ihe changed circumstances. Lack of time  and  opportunities for program 
planning and monitoring at this level seems, in  itself, Io account for the 
present mode of "administered"  operations, which is different from the more _- 
~  I 
~ 
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productive management mode required in today’s context. This has affected 
deterioration of the irrigation system. 
The annual maintenance allocations have also been a constraint for the 
upkeep of  the inigation syskm. The yardstick for maintenance which  Wils 
originally laid down in 1937, basically remains thesame to date, despite the 
multiplier effect of all the changes on maintenance needs. The wear and tear 
of lhe canal bank take place at a much  faster rate now due to increased 
trespassing by  vehicular  traffic,  especially  the  farm machinery  on  the 
kachcha (unpaved) canal banks and roads. Trespassing on canal areas was a 
rare occurrence during the days when  original maintenance norms Were 
established, and of similar low  level was  the incidence of  other aCtS  Of 
irrigation  misbehavior when  formal rules  were  strictly observed. The 








allocations do not meet even this yardstick due to inflationary pressure. The 
inadequacy of the present organization for maintenance, therefore, is major  1 
contributor to the deterioration of the system. 
I 
I 
I  PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
i 
SOME ANOMALIES IN THE 
The original administrative structure of  the  Department WBS  established 
primarily to maintain and operate the canal systems for distribution of water. 
As  described earlier, each canal system formed one administrative unit, 
called the Circle, under the charge of one Superintending Engineer (SE), a 
numkr  of such Circles forming a Zone which was to be under the direction 
of a Chief Engineer (CE). A Circle was divided into three of four  Divisions, 
each underanExecutive Engineer(XEN)  havinga numberofsub-Divisional 
Officers (SDOs). 
With the passage of time, waterlogging appeared in  the command areas 
of canals,  and  to circumvent this  problem  sepmte Sub-Divisions and 
Divisions were created for drainage functions and  were attached to  the 
Circles of the respective canals. With lhe increase in work load. it was later 
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Circles should be crcated. For example, Drainagecircle, Lahore, wascreated 
during the year 1951-52. The responsibility of  the Circle was to cater to the 
drainage functions  of  the Upper Chenah Canal, the Depalpur Canal and the 
Lower Bari  Doah  Canal systems, whereby  one unit  of drainage 
administration was  to  overlap  with  more than  one  unit of  canal 
administration. On  this arrangement. the SE of  Lahore Drainage Circle is 
under the adminisbative control of  CE, Lahore Zone, but  for  drainage 
functions he overlooks the canal area in the Lower Bari Doah Circle which 
is under the administrative control of CE, Mullan Zone. 
To compound this further was the creation of  SCARP Tube-Well  Circles. 
A large number of tube wells were inslalled in the command areas of some 
of the canal systems to control waterlogging, and the responsibility for their 
oper;\tion and maintenance was placed in these separate Circles which also 
overlap the Canal Circles. 
This three-dimensional  operation  (surface supplies, horizontal and 
vertical drainage) focusing on  the same  geographical ma  ha  naturally 
caused some administrative confusion in the Department. The headqumers 
or the CEs, SEs, XENs or even the SDOs and their Sub-Engineers for these 
separate functions are at different  places, sometimes hundreds of  miles apart 
and the  resultant  problems of  coordination  are the  main  causes  of 
administrative confusion and poor service to the farmers. 
The operalion of  the Lower Bari Doah Circle (LBDC) system -  see 
Figure 3 -  illustnles the scope of the problem. This canal system fist  came 
into operation in 1912. The headquarters of  the Circle was located at Sahiwal, 
almost in theccnterofthesyslem tom'ike iteasilyaccessihlelotheimgation 
community. The Circle is  divided into three Divisions  namely  Balloki 
Division (Head to RD 255), Sahiwal Division (RD 255 to RD 450) and 
Khanewal Division (RD 450  to tail RD 660). Each Division has three or four 
Sub-Divisions  with their offices located along the canal. The Sub-Engineers 
are also located in the canal colonies along the main canal and the major 
distrihutaies. The canal administration of the LBDC system is under the 
Chief Engineer in Mullan at a distance of abut  180 miles from Balloki, 120 
miles from Sahiwal, and 40 miles from Khanewal. 
The dninaye  component of the LBDC comes under the jurisdiction of SE 
Dninage Circle and his CE, both located  in Lahore. The office of  XEN 
Drainage Division known as Sikhrawa Division is located at Sahiwd. ahout DEFICIENCIES IN THEPRESENT INSTIIIIIIONAI. FRAMEWORK  43 
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100 miles from Lahore. The tube-well scheme at Shahbore toward the tail 
end of 4L distributary of LBDC, and some tube wells installed under the 
Grow More Food Project in Mopalke near the hcad reach of the LBX,  are 
maintained by the SE SCARP 111 Circle with headquarters at Multan, and his 
XEN’s office is also located  at  Mullan,  about  150-200 miles from  the 
tube-well locations. 
A fanner in Shahbore having any problem in canal operation has to first 
go to Balloki XEN’s olficc  about 60 miles away: failing to get redress there, 
he has to travel 40 miles to the SE’s office  at Sahiwal, or to the CE’s office 
at  Multan  which  is  155  miles  away.  For  any  problem  concerning  the 
functioning of the drains he has to contact XEN (Drainage)  at Sahiwal and 
SE Drainage Circle and  CE at Lahore, a distance of  80 miles from his 
location. For his problems concerning tube wells he is required to contact 
XEN and SE SCARP I11 Circle whose offices are located 31 Multan. Even at 
a closer level, for the same group of fanners in Shahbore, the office of the 
SDO  (Canals) is located at Renala Khurd, of the SDO (Drains) at Okara and 
of the SDO (Tube Wells) at Sahiwal. The farmers have to shuttle between 
these offices. 
This  situation is also very  embarrassing for coordination with  other 
departments, especially with  the  civil administration. For  example, the 
District  Coordination  Committee called  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner, 
Sahiwal will have to  be  attended by  XEN Balloki, XEN  Sahiwal, XEN 
Khanewal, XEN Drainage Sahiwal, and XEN SCARP Multan on  behalf of 
the Department.For thesame irrigation command area,threedifferent XENs 
have torespondon issuesofwaterdcliveries,surfacedrainageand  tube wells, 
respeclively. Most other departments are represented by one person while 
the Irrigation Department is always represented by anumber of  persons. The 
situation at khe  various departmental meetings is similar. 
The department has sporadically expanded through simple additions of 
new functions and wings, without any basis of rational or scientific study. 
The difficulties  faced by  the farmers  haveescapedattention when the legacy 
of the colonial period has been unduly protected. Changes seem necessxy 
after some dispassionate study  in this respect, to consider the costs and 
benefits of having a more integrated irrigation management structure at the 
Divisional level. Among Ihe beneficial aspects of such a change would be 
not only the potential for enhancedadministralive  coordination, but also and 
‘I 
I 
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more importantly, the increased opportunities for decentralizing decision 
making to a level which can effectively involve the fanner community. 
CENTRALIZED CONTROL OVER IRRIGATION 
Public  irrigation seems to exemplify the need  for  social  control over 
collective efforts in  managing natural resources. Refemng to  Dank A. 
Caponera’s (1968) excellent  discussion on  the  history  of  water  law. 
Radosevich (1975:l)  highlights the role of social control over water in the 
following comment: 
Water  is a basic naturalresource. Without  itspresence andproper control 
over the  distribution and  use, progressive  civilization is not possible. 
Indeed, there  is evidence  that, where  regulatory  controls have  been 
ejfcient, civilization  has grown; but  where these conrrols have been 
ineffective, civilizations have declined and often disappeared. 
Irrigation institutions serve to define and exercise this social control 
which an  both facilitale and promote improved irrigation performance for 
greater social benefit. The scope and chancter of a country’s irrigation 
institutions would determine whether this social control is to be  largely 
exercised through central agencies, or through decentralized institutional 
mechanisms involving the  water  users  in  a  significant role. This 
differentiation, in  the words of Flannery (1972). is to identify whether the 
control is exercised throu  h the “process of centralization.” or through the 
The evolutionary development  of irrigation institutions inPakistan, which 
was almost parallel to the steady growth of state intervention in irrigation, 
strongly suggests that the country’s chosen process for social control over 
imgation was centnlization. The early centralized control of  the feudalist 
order was basically retained and, in  fact, further strengthened during the 
“process of segregation.” 8 
1  For an analysis of Pakistan’s irrigation based an Rannery’s model, and fm  a sytmatic 
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I 
!  colonial  period. Nonotable effoahas  been made sinceindependenceto arrest 
Merrey (1987) points out that the “sellling” of muum (revenue villages), 
this continuing process of centralization. 
after the detailed surveys carried out by the British in the middle of  the 19th 
century, created a village community with a new legal basis, and that this 
also initialed the process of “centralization” since a higher-level order took 
over the control on land rights. With the expanded canal irrigation system 
administration,  the processofcentralization was reinforcedandaccelerated.’ 
The long conveyance system and the very complex infrastructure made it 
more difficult for the individual farmer to monitor his irrigation sources or 
salinity, the farmers were to depend on centrally formulated decisions and 
I 
! 





supplies. Even for problems of closer proximity, such as waterlogging and 
remedies. More and more organization mechanisms were gradually added to 
the original setup of  canal administration, following a typical process of  I 
i 
“linearization” referred to  by  Flannery (Merrey  1987: 367). The path of 
centralized control on irrigation seems to  have ended up in a blind alley, a 
very static situation as far as performance  is concerned, where formal rules 
areno longerrelevantandarecircumvented by numerous informal practices, 
and where the organizational structures have already outlived their validity. 
The most visible among the main causes for this impasse is the persistent 
low literacy among the rural people and their lack of  awareness which have 
entered into a vicious circle with centralized control. 
The situation calls for attempts to find viable options with decentralized 
mechanisms. A hypothesis at this stage is that the dominance of  informal 
rules over the centrally established formal rules can be substantially reduced 
if greater responsibility for management is tnnsfemed to the beneficiaries. 
, 
I 
1  However. our  point  of  depanum frm  this  analysis  is that  it  was  not  the  process of 
nnlralizatim that was initialed  by the British. but the fnmrlizatica and the reinfornment 
tooccupyandcultivatelandonbehalfofthcirfeudallords  whosedeci~ians  weretobeurried 
out by the subjects wiiAwt question. me inundatim  canals were consrluded snd apcrarul 
the  decision-making pmss  as  they were during that period. The  rigidity of empliance 
expected from them and the severity of penalty in case of noncmpliance were the sac. 
While lheuxltmlwas liftedtoa higherlevel  bythecolonialiladministntionlherebyinereasing 
the  degree of centralization, the status of the  individual or the pup  was not in my way 
altered. 
~ 
ofapmcess whichhaduisledduringrhefeudalistpriod.ThcpeoplehadonlyiconcesJion  I 
! 
in  a similar manner. The  individual  farmen before the colonial pcriod wcn  as remote fmm  ! DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  41 
Someevidencein supportof this view isemerging in pilot projects of various 
forms of fanner participation in other countries in the region (e.g., Sri Lanka, 
the Philippines),  but  the  issue has  not  yet  been  seriously addressed in 
Pakistan. Interestingly, before the advent of colonial administration in the 
region,  despite  autocratic  political  control,  the  management of  local 
resources such as water was substantially in the hands of  the local people, 
and even a little later, kacha wambandi was seen to be a locally managed 
system. At least some pilot studies in transfemng responsibility to fanner 
groups in Pakistan may  be a worthy attempt to arrest the country's main 
problem in irrigation management, the ovemding influenceof informal rules 
over the formal rules. 
However, to prepare a healthy environment for effective implementation 
of such attempts, a field-level capacity for proper information exchange 
seems to be an impomnt requirement. 
INFORMATION PROCESSES AND SERVICES 
The contradictions  between the various institutional components seem to be 
closely linked with  the lack  of  general awareness among the concerned 
people on relevant issues. The general awareness'  in Iurn, depends on the 
institutional backup available for developing the necessary capacity among 
the people to gain that awareness. This institutional impact is reflected in the 
status of litemcy'  and education of the population in general and of the rural 
I '"Awareness"  in  this  mntert has  been defined  as  a  developed level  of  perception and 
knowledge relating to the subslance and  significance of  water issucs.  and an associated 
developmeot of  attitude and motivation toward appropriate actim (Sadler 1987). Although 
waer has a pewasive influence  over human action. an adequate awareness on water iswe$ 
does nd  occur without deliberate efforts. Such an effon should cover both water usen and 
officials. 
2  The rate  of adult  illiteracy  in  Paktstan  is among the  highest  in  developiog  countries. 
According to World Development Repon (1990). the male illiteracy rate in Pakistan is 70 
percent which places itself between Nepal (74%)  and Bangladesh (67%)  (see Tables 3 and 
4). Considering the heavy relianceon agricultureRndonthelarge rural population forfunher 
advancement in industry. this deficiency is likely to be the mw  critical impdiment against 
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sector  in  particular.  Like  many other items  of  social  infrastructure, 
institutional support for information and education is heavily concentrated 
in  urban  centers, a  feature that  tends  to  perpetuate an  unhealthy 
communication gap between the uneducated information seekers and the 
educated extension and operational staff who invariably have an urban bias. 
Rural-urban and inter-regional disparity in literacy rates as shown in Table 
4 below can, to a large degree, represent other disparities affecting social 
capacity. 
The statistics in this Table show not only an alarming feature of regional 
disparity, but also an embarrassing revelation of a very slow progress in a 
decade of development, including even an apparent decline in Literacy in 
some areas. The reasons for this significant runl development issue to have 
so persistently escaped the attention of the planners are not very clear. In this 
context, a  major  question  would  probably  be  to  what  extent can  any 
motivation for change be established among those who mostly  stand to 
benefit from the weak  formal institutions and from the strong traditional 
practices,  and  whether  they  would  see any  value  in  developing  an 
institutional  capacity on a broader basis. 
A  reasonable standard of  literacy and awareness among  farmers, a 
professional outlook and  the  necessary knowledge and skill among the 
officials are essential for  the  long-term  support and collaboration for 
institutional  strengthening. An  overall  human  resources development 
strategy including appropriate technical training can enhance the capacity to 
develop the necessary institutions and improve irrigation performance. The 
valuable role played by  the USA Land Grant Colleges over the years in 
developing a strong base of public and private sector irrigation institutions 
is illustrative of this potential. 
A reliable database is an essential ingredient and a fundamental resource 
for policy planning and management. Mechanisms established to collect, 
analyze, use and disseminate  information obviously constitute an important 
institutional aspect What is not so obvious is the institutional character of 
the way in which information handling is perceived by the people in general, 
and  of  the value  attached to  this  subject. Both  these  aspects of 
institutionalized information handling directly affect irrigation performance. 
A recent  study has  showin  that  farmers in Pakistan seek information 
mainly from other farmers rather than  from line agencies and extension DEFICIENCIES IN  THE  PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  49 
1972 
1981 
Table 4.  Lireracy rates in Pakismn, 1972,1981 (in  %). 
9.2  1.2  5.6  42.4  19.2  32.3  14.8  4.2  10.1 
7.3  0.8  4.4  37.7  14.3  27.9  12.5  2.9  8.2 
I  R”*d  I  Urban  1  ~otai  population 
Unit  I  Male  Female  moth  I  Male  Female  Both I Male  Female  Both 
Bolurhisfon I  I  I 
1972 
1981 
19.0  2.2  11.0  44.7  19.9  33.7  23.1  4.7  14.5 
18.7  2.5  10.9  42.8  18.8  32.1  22.7  4.9  14.3 
1972 
1981 
22.9  5.2  14.7  47.8  28.0  38.9  29.1  10.7  20.7 
26.4  7.4  17.3  51.5  33.2  43.1  33.5  14.4  24.5 





20.8  3.4  12.7  60.0  48.8  55.0  30.0  10.0  21.0 
22.6  4.1  14.3  49.9  30.9  41.5  30.2  11.6  21.7 
23.1  5.5  14.8  51.5  33.7  43.4  31.8  13.7  23.3 
I  Memy identifies izm  (honor. esteem. rcpulation. status or face) as the most fuuddamenlal 
concept in mral Punjabi culture, which is  a naturaleo~lflict-generatbg  element of the society. 
discouraging cooperation on  a long-term basia. In  the historicat and sociological origins of 
imt, he  finds it to be leading only to contextual and tempomy “unity”  at me  level. in 
opposition to otherunits atthc same level. It is a ~em-sum  game in  which one’s  gnin of izzat 
is at  sme  aheis  loss of  izml (Merrey and Wolf 198637-40). Also.  see Merrey (1979). 
Akording to otlien who were ifimrviewed for !his pre~ent  study. izzat can serve as a more 
positive social ihstitutionwhere itcan  beused to developcooperatian Ihmughesprifdecorps, 
a regardforthe hmorofthegmuptowhichonehelongs.  Howcver,illerrisnortrollg research 
basis to support this percepim. so  INSTITUTIONAL  FACTORS AFFEffING  IRRIGATION ... 
competitive status enhancement or  one-upmanship, and  group loyalty 
prevent the seeking of information from formal and proper sources. 
The  heavy  reliance  on  traditional  methods  even  for information 
dissemination by official channels has been identified as a problem. The 
National Commission on  Agriculture (1988:268) draws attention to  the 
obsolescence of present formal mechanisms: 
Theprocess  of information dissemination to the  farmers still relies heavily 
on the rradirional means of communicarion which are known 10  be slow 
and ineflcienr. The coverage of all the villages (more than 45,000)  and 
4 million  farm  families by a limited number of extension stqffusing these 
traditional means will be impossible. The extremely rapid advances in 
communication  technology have made  the dissemination  of  rechnical 
information not only easier but also speedier and much more effective. 
But our extension staff are neither adequately trained nor have access lo 
modern  communicarion facilities and  the  use  of  audio-visuals in the 
rransfer  of  technology  has been minimal. As a result, the  impact  of 
technology generated at the research insrirutes  has reached only a limited 
proporrion offarmers. 
Another area of concern should be the low value attached to the accuracy 
of data at the point of collection as well as at the various stages of collation. 
The value-based attitude is  shown  in  a general  lack  of  supervision on 
routinely collectedandanalyzeddata,resulting  in relatively invalidand even 
distorted information. 
Itisnolongeramerenotionthattheleakagesintheformofunder-booking 
and recording of higherahiana (water nte, i.e.,  the rate charged for canal 
water  supplied for purposes of  imgation; this  is also interpreted as the 
occupier's rate) crops as lower-abiana crops take place. Consultants'  have 
reported  to the  government that  leakages occur not  only at the stage of 
booking, but also at the time of transferring records from khasras (field 
books) to khataunis on which demand bills are issued. Their conservative 
estimate is that about 33 percent of revenue leakage can be  saved if data 
1  See Associated  Consulling Engineen'  March  1990 repon on the  Nationwide Sludy for 
llnpmving Procedures for Assessment and Collection of  Water Charges and Drainage Cerr. 
Leakages thrmgh under-reponing am estimated at 4-5 percent in Punjab and NWFP. 25 






51  DEFlCIENCIES IN THE PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
handling is controlled at the first stage, and another 5 percent at the second 
stage. IIMI's own research found that in one watercourse command in the 
Upper Gugera Division, the cropped area in  khar$(summer  season from 
mid-April to mid-October) 1988 was 45 percent greater than shown in the 
official khasra for that season. Preliminary analysis of data from a sample 







abhna crops in the official documents. 
The implications of unreliahility of information, as illustrated by this level 
of  underreporting of a significantly important item of field data, cannot be 
overestimated. It directly affects not only the collection of revenue, but also 
many other imgation management aspccts such as the scheduling of water 
supplies, the  determination of  cropping patterns and  intensity, and  the 
concern on  management information can also be seen in the way  canal 
discharge measurement data are collected and used. Significant differences 
have been observed between officially recorded data and actual discharges 
according  to  IIMI's  measurement data  for  the Lagar  and Pir  Mahal 
distributaries.  The main reason for this discrepancy could be that the gauge 
observers in these two Sub-Divisions are using discharge tables that are 
typically more than 20 years old (Vander Velde 1990), but the effect  Of 
possible complacence on the part of official supervision cannot be totally 
overmled. 
Information processes are a major determinant of  the assimilation of 
of reliability of infcwmation, and of concern on all these aspects combine to 
form an adverse effect on the validity and effectiveness  of formal rules, and 
supremacyofinformal rules. Acriticallyimportantfacetofthisphenomenon 





formulation of  valid agricultural and investment policies. Lack of serious 
I 
I 
various institutional components. Lack of general awareness, of information, 
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IRRIGATION AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
The ground situation demonstrates that despite notable advances made in 
overall ngricultural production in Pakistan and its apparent contribution to 
the development pockets mostly in urban areas,  its impact on the poor in runl 
areas has not been very satisfactory. The official recognition of this fact can 
be  seen  in  the  following statement  by  the National  Commission on 
Agriculture (1988:9): 
During  a period  of  declining  public  investment  in agriculture  and 
irrigation, expenditure  on  research  and  extension  has exceeded  the 
target,  rhough it would seem that there has not been a comparable impact 
of thison smull andlow-income  farmers  .... In  fact.performance regarding 
the lot of  small farmers has been least satisfactory. No specific policy 
instruments or packages have as yet been devised for this category of 
producers despite the stated objectives. The Sixth Plan policies of  input 
subsidies and price supports  for cash crops workedmore to rhe advantage 
of largefarmers who also managed to pre-empt a major portion of the 
subsidy on credit andfertilizer. In  fact.  mostof the increasesinproduction 
resultedfrom the minor@ of the large and the medium farmers and the 
yieldgaps between the progressive and tradirional  farmers remain wide. 
The overall institutional support has not adequately benefitted all crops 
nor all categories of farmers. 
The ovenll national statistics alsoconfirm theobservable  poor conditions 
in rural ma$  where the dnma of irrigation is actually played. The average 
per capita income in Pakistan’s rural areas where about 70 percent of its 106 
million population lives is currently less than half that in urban area,  and 
value added per worker in agriculture which employs about SO percent of the 
work force is less than one-third of the rest of  the economy.’ The apparent 
prosperousscenein themajor cities beliesthepoorslatusof,andconlribution 
by, the majority in runl area:  the effect  of this poverty burden CM  be seen 
in Pakistan’s low per capita gross national product of only US $350, lower 
than in  some of the other less-resource-cndowcd  countries in  the region 
I See for more details. OECD’s “Agriculture Gmwlh and Econmic Development: The Case 
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(World Bank 1990). Pakistan’srelativeposition  in its overall socioeconomic 
status compared to  some similar developing countries can he seen in Table 5. 
The  reasons for  this conspicuous anomaly have to be found in the national 
policies which obviously, as indicatcd earlier in the conceptual background 
to this piper, are closely related to the current institutional framework. Its 
static natureactsasan impediment tothe formulation of  progressivepolicies, 
illustrating  the vicious circle in  which  policies and  institutions are 
interlinked. In an overview of the  policy scene of the past few decades, 
Hamid and Tim  (199012) make the following comment which confirms 
the obsetvations on ground 
No noticeable progress has been made over the past 25 years in rural 
education: literacy has remained a/  a low level. even compared to that of 
other cottntriesar thesameor lessersmgei~develul?nzent.  Thisisamajur 
handicap  fur  the lower inrome strara, even if the labour market dCVelo/)S 
in a  ~nnnner  that promises full absorption  of  supplies.  Also  health 








to rural health facilities appears in facr ro have rfeclincd. There is  a 
remarkable  contrast  in Pakistun between  rhe  arreiition  paid  to  the 
I 
I 
improvements of its agriculrural base and un-farm capitalization. and /he 
relarive rieglect of rhe .supporting environnient. Litrle care hos been given 
fa  the people or the social iilfrastructtire. 
The policies  that  were aimed at  improving  the agricultural  base and 
econoniic development through investment, price adjustmenls and income 
transfers  ignored two, apparently interrelated, major features of the country’s 
irrigation  sector. The policies  were  not  only  insensitive to the 
uneven  land distribution. Consequently, the  opportunities and  incentives 
provided by such well-intended policies favored the few large landowners. 




earlier-mentioned skewed social capacity within the sector, hut also to its  I 
i 
i '  GNPper  Growth  Agrlcu-  Life  Illiteracy (56) 
country  raplla  rate  ItureW  expectancy 
(US,  1%)  (%)  dGNP  (years)  Female  Male 
Bangladesh  170  0.4  46  51  78  67 
Bhum  180  44  48 
Ian  56  51  88  74 
Burkina Fsso  210  1.2  39  47  94  87 
Nepal 
Nigeria  290  0.9  34  51  69  58 
India  340  1.8  32  58  71  57 
Pakistan  350  2.5  26  55  81  70 
Sri Lanka  420  3.0  26  71  17  13 
lndonesis  440  4.3  24  61  35  26 
Sudan  480  0.0  33  50 
Philippines  630  1.6  23  64  15  14 
Infant mwtllity  Maternal  Population  Annual 
cwntry  rnte/l,OOO  mor(.lily  (million)  population 
live birlhs)  (/lW,OW)  growth rate (%) 
Nepal  126 








Indonesia  800 
Sudan  106  607 
Philippines  44 

















However, the  overall  distributions of  farms  in number and  size are 
skewed. In such a situation, access to  major inputs is fairly inequitable and 
so is the access to benefits from irrigation water. Although land distribution 
and hydrological layout cannot be clearly correlated, it has been observed  i 
1  The  developing countries menlimed in this Table are some of  those in which irrigation is 
used as a major development nmtegy. and  whem IlMI pmgms  are also located. DEFlClENClES IN THE PRESENT lNS77TU77ONAL  FRAMEWORK  55  ~ 
I 
that  ‘‘canal  supplies tend  to  be pre-empted  by  large farmers near  the 
1990).  More clearly seen is the skewed access to tube-well water, the cost of 
I 
I 
distribution channels, while small farmers occupying the far reaches of the 
system may receive inadequate and unreliable supplies” (Hmid and Tim 
which only the larger farmers can easily afford. 
This brings to focus an area at which allocative policies can probably be 
directed. While scale-neutrality is assumed for the benefits of canal water 
supplyasitsdistribution is basedon theextentof landto beirrigated, in terms 
landowner and  the head-end farmer  in  a more favorable position. The 
ownership of  land is concerned with  a broader national-level allocative 
policy involving agrarian and land reforms, but the location-based equity 
problem is a typical irrigation management policy issue. Incentive structures 
for  groundwater  development  can  provide  opportunities  to  help  the 
water-starved  tail-end  farmers,  and  if  the  institutional  barriers are 
appropriately  handled  they can  even  be directed  toward  methods of 
conjunctive use of anal and groundwater aimed  at reducing the present 
disconcerting features of inequity. 
In large-scale, publicly administered irrigation systems suc.h 3s those in 
Pakistan, thepossibilities  of helping the sizeable section of  the land-porn (the 
landlessandagriculturallabor) in therural populationcannotbeclearly seen, 
but must be sought through conscious efforts (Silliman and Lenton  1987). 
However, for irrigation to contribute effectively toward poverty alleviation, 
this significant section of  Ihe rural poor should also be within the ambit of 
















I  Institutions as a Determinant of Performance 
IN  PAKISTAN,  LAND  and  water  are  both  becoming  limiting factors Of 
agricultural  production.  The annual  growth rates  of  farmgate  Water 
availability have gradually declined as can be seen in the figures for periods 
196067, 1968-78,  and 1978-86 which were 3.9 percent, 2.7 percent and 
1.6 percent respectively.’  A greater decline was seen in the growth rates of 
irrigatedareaforthesruneperiods,from2,7percentin  196067  to 1.5perCent 
in 197846.  Observing the rapidly approaching limits to the expansion Of 
productive land under irrigation in  Pakistan. the National Commission on 





I  Of  all  the inputs in agriculture. the greatest gains can be expected from 
more efficient use ofwater,  which also mimizes  gainsfromother inputs 
such  as fertilizer. Increasing  agricultural  production  will, therefore.  I 
I 
depend  crucially  on  the  rational  use  of  land. land  improvement, 
increasing rhe supply ofwater by reducing the water losses, more eflcient 
I 
waler use and berter agrononurpractices. 
This view corresponds with a global concern on irrigation development 
and management. Irrigated area in the world has increased from 40 million 
hectares in 1900 to morethan 225 million hectares, but the investments have 
notproven tobe asproductiveasoriginally anticipated (Johnson 1990).  With 
the realization that the enhancing of  resource and technological inputs is 
reaching its own limitations, there is an increasing concern on the way these 
two  factors are  managed to produce desired  goods  and  services. The 
! 
1  SeelheRepon oftlie NationalComrnission on Agriculture (1988:283-288).The time periods 
have been chosen 10  coincide with significant infrastnrcture development. Mangla Dam  in 
1967 and Tamela in  1976. 
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emphasis is on the proper management of irrigation systems than on further 
infrastructure  dcvelopment.’ 
An issue of special concern to Pakistan is the declining growth rates of 
food production and  crop yields as compared to  the rapidly increasing 
population. TheNationalCommissionon Agriculture(l988)refers toayield 
growth requirement of 3 percent per year to match the growth in the demand 
for wheat by the year 2000. Even to achieve an annual yield growth rate of 
2 percent, it is estimated that the average yield in irrigated areas  would need 
to increase substantially from 1.8 tons per hectare in 1984-86 to 2.5 tons per 
I 
I  hectare by 2000 (Byerlee and Siddiq 1989). Annual yield and production 
levels in both wheat and rice for the last decade as shown in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 indicate. the difficulty  in achieving this target. 
When neilhertheimgatedareanorthecropping  intensity canbeincreased 
any further,  the effort has to be necessarily in increasing the productivity. An 
increasing  realization  under  these circumstances is that  productivity 
“management sense” into the systems operations which are currently in an 
“adminisIralive mode” and  also by  benefiting  from modern  tools  Of 
management science. 
beenorcanbedevelopedcan beofeffectiveassistance whenconfrontedwith 
the existing static institutional framework.  What can be more often identified 
is a gradually worsening situation regarding the institutional impact on 
performance,  which  is leading  the  irrigation  systems  to  a  stage  of 
“unmanageability” (Murray-Rust 1989). It  is an  easier task  to develop 
management innovations and even to bring about an awareness on the value 
of a more dynamic management approach, than to see them applied in the 
“real life” situation which is  often characterized by  institutional barriers 
rather than by institutional support. 
What  management science can  offer in  this  instance, in  terms  of 
is in this institutional context that management has been found to be a myth 
improvement has to result from better management and by bringing about a  I 
It  is arguable, however, whether any management innovation that has  i 
~ 
I 
management techniques or decision-support systems, is of limited value. It  ! 
I  See Jd~nsm  111 (1990). Analyzing dataon imgitim investments by donor mganizations and 
developnent~nks.lohnronpointJ  outthatbetterOBMfundingand imprwednlanagemenl 
would deternine future levels of investment in irrigatim in Asin. The failure a,  the pan of 
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97W76  77/78  7VlM  81/81  83/84 
mar ! 
60  INSTlTUnONAL FACTORS AFFECTING IRRIGAnON ... 
in most irrigation projects in the tropics (Bromley 1987).' The reason for 
considering this as a myth in the South Asian conlext is further clarified by 
the following authoritative statement by an Indian analyst (Sundar 1984): 
! 
i 
In  a socio-political situation where what is legitimate is what one can gel 
And if there is no desire ro  manage, what can management techniques 
do? In the land of nudisrs, what can a washerman do? 
Some of the recent research findings by  IIMI in Pakistan point toward 
similar difficulties in  the  application of management  innovations. The 
existing equity conditions along the secondary canals of the Lower Chenab 
Canal Gugera Branch were found to differ substantially from the design 
assumptions (Bhutta and Vander Velde 1989; Bhutta 1990), and different 
management options to  reduce inequity were  developed by  means  of  il 
computer-based hydraulic model (Bhutta 1990). The application of  any Of 
these options, however, requires not only some structud modifications 
(changes in existing design criteria), but also changes in several operational 
rules and procedures.  Without  positive  support  from  departmental 
policymakers, the system manager is unable to effect any change at his level. 
More importantly, without the cooperation from the more influential  farmers 
who stand  to  benefit  from  the  existing  pattern  of  operations, new 
management options can never be effectively introduced. 
An  emphasis on  resource development  and  technological  change 
neglecting the necessary adaptation in the overall institutional framework 
does not achieve desired optimum results in irrigation performance. Also, an 
emphasis on  sporadic  structural  adjustments  in  existing irrigation 
organizations without considering the need to review their underlying rules 
is also unproductive. In attempts to improve irrigation performance in many 
1  Bmley  argues !ha1 management is the missing key ingredient in  the successful aperations 






of  irrigation systems  in developing countries because  they have not yet addressed the real 
market value d  water. An unappreciated distinction between technique and  institutions. 
divisions of  respmribilily, and  an institutional vacuum that has existed in many countries 
his obsewation  !hat management IedIniques  are usefulonly  in  the presence of pmper enabling 
instihlions, this paper identifies he  problem of exoessive influence by informal institutions 
which negates !he  effect offomally ealablished inrtitutions. 
sinceihedeini~edcdonialismsresecnbyhimpspansdthispmblem.While~greeingwith  i 
I 
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instances, irrigation rules  have  been  a relatively  neglected area. While 
management improvement is seen as the most fruilful intervention at this 
stage when resource and technical inputs are reaching limitations, returns to 
such interventions can be realized only by appropriately changing the rules 
and  roles to remove  the  institutional barriers  which  hinder  effective 
application of  management innovations. 
A  few attempts at organizational experiments aimed at better inputs 
coordination and user  cooperation  (e.g..  Command Water Management 
Projects and  Water Users'  Associations) have  not  yielded  desired and 
satisfactoryresults. The failureis alrriburable  to perceived nmw  objectives 
of  these pilot trials, and the fragmented approach to institutional change. 
More importantly, the passive role of thePIDs in theseattempted  innovations 
seems to have contributed to this failure in no small measure. 
I 
I 
! CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions 
ACCORDING  TO THE broader definition adopted in this paper, institutions 
include both rules and roles. In the management of irrigation systems, the 
imgation rules comprising formal laws, regulations and procedures, as well 
as informal lraditions, customs, rights and practices are as  equally important 
as the irrigation organizations which, in fact, are the structured work roles 
determined by  such rules. Some of the formal rules are also the tools of 
management in its regulatory aspects. 
In  any social system, its external and internal constraint%  formal and 
informal institutions, and  its ability to  formulate policies  are closely 
interlinked. Together they  determine the  degree of management 
performance.  However, within  a  given  framework  of constraints, 
possibilities exist to change institutions and gain flexibility for formulating 
and implementing new policies, provided that the mutuality of  influence 
between institutions and policies is given due recognition. The greatest 
barrier to  foster improved performance is an  attitude that tends to show 
reluctance  and diffidence in changing  existing institutions and  policies, 
despite the common realiwtion that they are inappropriate for current needs. 
In such a static situation, illiterate farmers, politicized administration, and 
performance. 
Among  the  institutional  factors that  affect Pakistan’s  irrigation 
performance are the problems of  complex and outdated formal rules and 
procedures compounded by theoverriding effect of several socially evolved 
informal institutions, and the associated management deficiencies of a static 
administrative structure. Original intentions of  ensuring strict discipline for 
codified behavior in water distribution,  as well as  in water use, can no longer 
be achieved through the present institutional framework, due to changed 
circumstances in the social and physical environments. 
With  the  changes in the  sociopolitical systems after  the  demise of 
colonialism. the modem democntic values and the old cultural values have 




informal social pressure are the persistent reasons attributed to suboptimal  I 
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manifestations in the field. An  appropriate congruence between these two 
aspects should be the basis for any reform in irrigation rules to make them 
widely acceptable, and reasonably beneficial to the majority. The changes in 
the physical environment such as increased population, increased demand 
for land and irrigation, newly surfacing ecological threats, newly introduced 
technology, and the advent of  groundwater development pose interesting 
challenges to irrigation management. To meet these challenges effectively, 
the system managers require appropriate institutional adaptations  to convert 
present institutional barriers to useful institutional support. 
A  centraked administration designed to control a large supply-oriented 
canal irrigation system has lost its effectiveness, if not largely its relevance, 
in an emerging demand-oriented system. The regional and location-specific 
management requirements imposed by additional tube-well water on theone 
hand,anddifferent cropping patterns and intensities, different  environmental 
conditions and different social characteristics on the other, characterize this 
emerging demand pattern. Centralization needs to be replaced  by appropriate 
decentralized mechanisms, remote control by  more intimate performance 
monitoring, andnanow departmenlalism by greater coordination. 
Review of formal irrigation rules, measures to arrest the dysfunctional 
effect of  some informal rules, and an  overall assessment of the  whole 
structure of irrigation organization are the urgently needed research and 
policy initiatives. They are the prerequisites for appropriate institutional 
adaptation to meet the changing needs of improved irrigation performance 
in Pakistan. More specifically, the paper identifies the following priorities: 
i.  RevisingofCanalActsandAmendmentsintoacompositesetoflegal 
instruments taking account of  present needs and the increasing rigor 
of informal institutions,  and incorporating  more viable 
implementation  mechanisms with  adequate beneficiary 
participation; 
ii.  Updating all manuals of  procedure into a composite code to enable 
improved planning,  implementation  and  management  control  at 
different levels: 
iii.  Rationalizing forms, registers and returns making them  not only 
compatiblewith modem management information  systemsbut useful 
for current needs of performance assessment; I 
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iv.  Reviewing present organizational smctures of  PIDs with a view to 
removing Dresent administrative anomalies and making them more  -. 
effective in  supporting and monitoring irrigation management at 
Divisional level where greater farmer participation can be achieved 
in decision making: and 
I  v.  Introducing measures  to  increase general  awareness and 
communication among the farmers as  well as the operating staff. 
Any form of  institutional change requires positive support from senior 
managers and policymakers. Such attempts can be fruitful when they are 
strongly based  on  local  initiatives  and  on  a full  underslimding of  the 
prevailing internal and external constraints, and when  they  are correctly 
placed in the socioeconomic context. 
I 
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THE DEPARTMENT IS headed by the Secretary, Irrigation and Power, under 
the direction of  the Minister for Irrigation and Power. The Secretary is 
assisted by one Additional Secretary and five Deputy Secretaries in charge 
of  five Wings:  Administration,  General, Operation,  Development  and 
Power. The secretariat has about 200 members of supportive staff. Figure 6 
gives its organizational pattern up to the level of Section Officers. 
I 
Figure 6.  Organization at secretariat level, Punjab PID. 
Secretary I 
S.O. (E  I) 
S.O. (E 11) 
S.O.  (E 111) 
S.O. (E IV) 















S.0,  (Statioticr) 
Notes:  S.O.  =  Section Officer  P&E  =  Planning and Evaluation 
US. =  UnderSecretaly  DY DIR  =  Deputy Director 
O.S.D.  =  Officer on Special Duty  EP&C  =  Evaluation. Planning and 
E.  =  Establishment  Cmrdination 
PAC  =  Public Accounts Cmmittee  Admin.  =  Administration 
T&M  =  Tubewell and Machinery  L&W  =  Land  and Water Development 
I 
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For administrative purposes, the Department is divided into ten Zones or 
Regions, each administered by a Chief Engineer. Among them, five Chief 
Engineers have temtonal jurisdiction over different parts of the irrigation 
system, while the other five Chief Engineers have functional duties and 
provide services to  the  territorial Chief  Engineers. For example, Chief 
Engineer, Research is responsible for research in hydraulic problems and 
other allied  fields connected  with  Soil and  Water,  and  Chief  Engineer, 
Development provides services  such as excavation machinery and workshop 
facilities  required by  the  field.  The  schematic representation  of  this 
arrangement is given in Figure 7. 
As seen Irom the schematic diagram, each Region or Zone headed by a 
Regional/Operational Chief Engineer (CE) has a number of  Circles, each 
under the charge of a Superintending Engineer. These Circles are of  two 
types: Operational or Open Canal Circle, and Functional or Servicing Circle. 
In each Region, there are two to three OperationaVOpen Canal Circles, and 
some subject-specific Circles such as Drainage, Tube-Well Operation, and 
Link Canal. 
CIRCLES 
So far as the management of  the canal system is concerned, an Open Canal 
Circle is a complete unit responsible for operation, maintenance, regulation, 
water  distribution, recording of  irrigated area and assessment of water 
revenue of one complete canal system under its charge. A Superintending 
Engineer (SE)  being  head  of  a circle  is responsible for all  operations 
concerning one canal system. His headquarters is normally located close to 
the center of the system to provide easy access to the irrigators. As shown in 
theschematicdiagram inFigure7,thereare 15 Maincanal Systemsandthus 
there are 15 Open Canal Circles. His jurisdiction is territorial and extends up 
to the irrigation boundary of the canal system in his charge. For example, the 
jurisdiction of the SE, the LCC East Circle extends from the Head of the 
Upper Gugera Bnnch at Sagar to the tails of the system up  to the Haveli 
Canal, a length of  about 150 canal miles, to distribute 4,029 cusecs through APPENDIX  69 70  INSTI’”TI0NAL  FACTORS AFFECTING IRRIGATION ... 
3,006 outlets serving aculturablecommandareaof  1,607,935  acres. For this 
purpose he has to maintain and operate channels about 1,271 miles long. 
A Superintending Engineer has powers under the Canal and Drainage Act 
VIII of 1873  as Superintending  Canal Officer to hear appeals of the irrigators 
against thedecisions ofDivisional Canal Officers (ExecutiveEngineers)  and 
his decisions are final and binding on all parties. 
DIVISIONS  i 
For operation and maintenance of  a canal system, a Circle is further divided 
into two or three Divisions. An Executive Engineer, popularly referred to as 
XEN, is in charge of a canal Division under the administrative control of  the 
Superintending Engineer. The Division is the executive unit for operational 
activities, and the Executive Engineer is the “kingpin” or the department. 
engineers and staff under him are to assist him to perform his field duties. 
He is the custodian of  basic records and has up-to-date information on the 
situation  in  the command area, and monitors  the  regulation  and water 
distribution of all channels in the Division. 
An Executive Engineer has multidisciplinary duties to perform and is 
given  authority in  this  regard.  He  is required to  conduct surveys and 
investigations, prepare schemes and  estimates and  execute works,  with 
approval by the SE in case of estimates above the value of Rs. 25,000. He is 
required  to  collect  hydraulic  and other  technical data, to  watch  the 
performanceofthechannels in hischarge,andtoinitiateaction  forcorrective 
measures. 
On financial and accounting matters, an Executive Engineer, as Head of 
a Division, is independently responsible to the Director, Audit, Finance 
Department, Punjab. For this purpose, the Director, Audit, posts a Divisional 
Accountant as  his representative to assist the Executive Engincer to maintin 
the accounts of the Division properly and to exercise initial check. 
To administer the canal supplies and to settle the disputes of irrigators,  an 
Execulive Engineer is gazetted as a “Divisional Canal Officer” under the 
Canal  and  Drainagc Act  of  1873. He  is declared a First Class  Canal 
I 
The engineers above him  are controlling and directing  officers while  I 
i 
I 
I  I 
I 
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Magistrate to perform his duties under the Canal Act. All claims, disputes 
and complaints of  irrigators are decided upon by him as the Divisional Canal 
Officer. 
An Executive Engineer also has to perform duties as a Revenue Officer. 
In thiscapacity he is responsibleforrecordingareaimgatedundereachoutlet 
along with cropdaraandthenpreparingdemandstatementsforthecollection 
of water rates at the end of each crop season. These demand statements are 
submitted to the Dishict Civil Administration for collection of revenue. The 
Executive Engineer has, under his control, a Revenue Wing headed by a 
Deputy Collector. 
SUB-DIVISIONS 
A  Division  is further subdivided into three or  four subunits known  as 
Sub-Divisions, each headed by  a Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) who is a 
qualified  engineer. He is also recognizedas  the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer 
under theCanalandDrainageActof1873and has thepowersofaMagistrate 
Class I1 to adjudicate cases concerning the canal offenses under the Canal 
Act and to settle  disputes among irrigators. He holds delegated administntive 
and financial authority for his ma  as a subunit of the Division. 
The SW  is responsible for the operation and maintenance, distribution 
of water, and “booking” the irrigated area in the portion of  canal commands 
in his charge, under the administrative control of  the Executive Engineer of 
the  Division.  A  Sub-Division,  ordinarily, consists of  three  or  four 
Engineering Sections and two to three Zilladari Sections. 
SECTIONS 
The smallest unit on the Engineering side is a “Section.” The Head of a 
Section  is  a  Sub-Engineer who  is  basically a  diploma holder in  Civil 
Engineering.  He  is responsible for the distribution of  supplies and  the 
maintenance  of distributaries/minors  up  to  about  100 to  150 cusecs 12  INSTITUnONAI.FACM)RS AFFECTING IRRIGA’TION ... 
discharge. Sub-Engineers’ offices are located in canal colonies along the 
channels at about 5-mile intervals to ensure more intimate surveillance  over 
irrigation supplies. The Sub-Engineer who is assisted by Masons, Misrries 
(aMis(ryisthesupervisorof3  to4Mates: healsoassiststheSub-Engineer), 
Males (a Mate is the head  gangman of  a gang of 8 Beldars) and Canal 
PatrolslBeldars (a Beldar who is also known as a gangman is an Inigation 
Department  workman  who  patmls canal embankments and canies out 
routine maintenance. One Beldar is usually employed for 2 miles of main 
canal and for 6 miles  of  distributaries or  minors) for maintenance and 
watching of  channels, also has gauge readers under him  for regulation and 
observationof waterflow.EachcanalcolonyhasaRestHouseforinspecting 
officers to stay and a telegraph/telephone office for transmitting the gauge 
readings and other important regulation and urgent messages. 
The smallest unit  in the PID’s revenue organization is the Zilladari 
Section, headed by a Zilladar, the canal official who supervises the work of 
about 10 Patwaris (Irrigation Record Keepers). A Zilladar is a direct recluit 
having  a  degree from a  recognized  university, preferably a B.Sc.  in 
Agriculture. After selection, he undergoes six months’ field training under a 
serving Zilladar and is required to pass the Patwari examination after which 
he is posted as a Patwari for one crop period. A further four-month training 
is given in the Land Revenue Department before he is  posted as a Zilladar. 
A Palwari is selected from accepted lists in each Division, and given not less 
than three months’ practical training after which he has to pass the Palwari 
examination for being posted as a canal Patwari. Each Patwari is supposed 
to record an extent of irrigation of  3,000  to S,000acres, and thus, a Zillaciar’s 
supervision covers an area of about 30,000  to 50,000 acres. Zilladars’ offices 
are also located in canal colonies along with the Sub-Engineer to facilitate 
easy access for irrigators. 
Figure 2 gives  the Organization Chart of  the Zonal Chief Engineer, 
Irrigation, Faisahbad (with details on one SE and one XEN), and illustrates 
the hierarchical mngement involving different levels of staff in a typical 
Zone. APPENDIX 
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L.G.  Division 
Buraia Division 
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The  Superintending Engineer,  the  Lower Chenab Canal Fast Circle is 
responsible for the operation, maintenance, regulation and distribution of 
water of the Upper Gugen Canal taking off from the LCC at Sagar Head 
with adesigndischargeof 6,000cusecsalong with the Mianwali Branch with 
a discharge of 523  cusecs, having a territorial jurisdiction over the command 
area of the Upper Gugera Canal, the Mianwali Branch, the Lower Gugera 
Branch and the Burala Branch canals. It covers a gross area of  1,910,877 
acres from Saga  up to the Haveli Canal where the tails of the Lower Gugera 
and Burala Branch canals end. 
The Circle is composed of three Divisions: the Upper Gugera Division, 
the Lower Gugera Division and the Burala Division. Their salient statistics 
are given below in Table 6 
Table 6.  Salient sratislics of the LCC East Circk. 
435  1.653  1,050  701,133  576,233  763,612 
429  1.834  989  621.524  521,M4  696.677 
408  1542  947  588.220  J10.638  704.723 
1.271  4,029  3,006  1,910,877  1,607,935  2,165,012 
122 I  I  I  I  I  I 
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UPPER GUGERA DIVISION 
The  Upper  Gugera  Division  extends over  the  irrigation boundary  or 
command areaof theupper Gugera Branch Canal from its offtake  pint  from 74  INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING IRRIGATION ... 
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the LCC Main Canal at Sagar Head to RD 282,OOO covering a gross area of 
701,133  acres.ThisDivisionmainlains444milesofchannelsanddistributes  I 
1,632 cusecs of  water through 952 outlets and irrigates about 763,600 acres 
annually. 
The Executive Engineer, the Upper Gugera Division is also the indenting 
officer for the LCC East Circle. He collects indents from all three Divisions 
and places  a composite indent on  XEN  Khanki  Division  for releasing 
supplies to the Upper Gugera Branch at Sagar Head. 
The Upper Gugera Division  is further subdivided  into three 
Sub-Divisions: the FarooqabadSub-Division,  theMohlan Sub-Division,  and 
the hcca  Dalla Sub-Division. 
FAROOQABAD SUB-DIVISION 
The Farooqabad Sub-Division is responsible for the O&M of the Upper 
Gugera Branch Canal from Head  to  control point RD  161,000 and the 
distributaries offtaking from  the Upper  Gugera Canal in this reach. The 
jurisdiction of  the SDO, Farooqabad, covers a gross area of 216,367 acres 
for which a discharge of 462 cusecs is distributed through 226 outlets with 
an annual irrigation of 237,800 acres. The SDO is responsible for the O&M 
of 137 miles of the distributaries. 
The Farooqabad  Sub-Division  is  further  subdivided  into three 
Engineering Sections: the Farooqabad Section at Farooqabad Canal Colony, 
the Ajinianwala Section at Ajinianwala Canal Colony, and the Gajiana 
Section at Gajiana Canal Colony. 
Each Section is headed by  a Sub-Engineer, a diploma holder in Civil 
Engineering. This is the smallest engineering unit, which is also closest to 
the farm level. The Sub-Engineer of  the Farooqabad Section is responsible 
for the operation and maintenance of the GhaurdourandLagar distributaries, 
and thus in volumetric terms, for the distribution of  about 100 cusecs. His 
jurisdiction as far as water delivery is concerned is only up  to the cam1 
boundary or the mogha (outlet). He has a labor force under his charge for 
watching and maintaining channels. The Sub-Engineer,Farooqabad,  has the 
following eslablishment  for performing his duties: APPENDIX  IS 
Supervisors/Mistries =  3 
Assistant Supervisors =  5 
Gauge Readers  =  11  (One for each Regulation Site) 
RegulationPatrols  =  10 
Canal Pairols/Beldars =  39  (One Beldarn miles of main canal and 
One Beldar/6 miles of distributariedminor) 
Gatekeepers  =2 
Bullockmen  =  3  (One cart + 2 Bullocks) 
The Farooqabad Sub-Division is also divided into five Revenue Sections, 
each headed by a Zilladar. A Zilladar has jurisdiction over the watercourse 
command, beyond the outlets, and supervises the work of about 10 “Canal 
Patwaris” under his charge. A Canal Patwari is the official who makcs the 
initial recording  of  area irrigated on  which  the  canal  water  revenue is 
assessed and collecled. A Canal Patwari is placed  in  charge of  a Halqa 
consisting of  a defined group of villages. A “Halqa” is generally defined on 
the assumption that each Patwari will cover about 3,000 to 5,000 acres of 
irrigation per annum. References 
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